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Abstract
Water Scarcity and Population Displacement in Southern Iraq: Perceptions and Reality
Tiba Fatli
The American University in Cairo
under the supervision of Dr. Usha Natarajan

This thesis argues that water scarcity causes significant displacement in Iraq’s southern region. It
makes two related sub-points. First, in addition to local factors, international and transnational
factors contribute to water scarcity and attendant displacement in Southern Iraq. Second, the
stakeholders – whether displaced populations, local government officials, federal policy makers,
non-governmental organizations or international development organizations – focus on particular
factors of water scarcity rather than addressing the causes holistically. In general, researchers and
policy-makers underestimate or neglect water-related causes of displacement, not only in Iraq but
globally. Even when addressed, emphasis is placed on local and national causes, without
contextualizing the relationship between internal and external factors. This thesis asks for more
attention to be paid to how national, international, and transnational factors operate alongside and
in relation to each other. Effective policies also need to understand how displaced persons perceive
these factors because their lived experiences often differ from institutionalized international
narratives on resource management. Ultimately, policy-making will be more effective at all levels
by better understanding the water-related reasons for displacement in the national, international,
and transnational contexts in an interrelated way.
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Introduction
The Arab region is among the most vulnerable to climate change.1 Among the Arab countries,
the United Nations (UN) has listed Iraq as “one of the Arab region’s most vulnerable countries to
climate change.”2 In particular, a 10 per cent to 60 per cent reduction in precipitation in the
Turkish highlands predicted by the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is
3

expected to reduce the flow of the Tigris and Euphrates into Iraq. One recent study reveals that
the Euphrates River has lost at least 40 per cent of its flow to downstream countries since 1972
and predicts a further reduction in the overall flow of the river in the coming decade. In fact, the
entire fertile crescent may disappear by the end of the century.4 Ironically, Iraq is undergoing
complications in water availability despite having one of the most abundant water resources in
the Arab region.5 In addition, Iraq faces more frequent and severe sand and dust storms as well
as extreme heat and drought episodes, that are also impacting livelihoods. Water scarcity and
increases in environmental hazards are the direct result of climate change.6

Climate change has numerous detrimental human implications, including, among other things,
forced movement. During the 2007 to 2009 droughts that Iraq experienced, almost 40 per cent of

1

Pilifosova, O. "Chapter 7: The Regional Impacts of Climate Change" in eds. R.T. Watson, M.C. Zinyowera, and R.H. Moss The Regional Impacts of Climate
Change, An Assessment of Vulnerability (Cambridge University Press, IPCC, 1997).
2
"Climate change in Iraq." Relief Web. 2012. Access at <
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Climate%20change%20In%20Iraq%20Fact%20sheet%20-%20English.pdf> .
3
IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change [Solomon, S.; Qin, D.; Manning, M.; Chen, Z.; Marquis, M.; Averyt, K.B.; Tignor, M.; and Miller,
H.L. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, United States. Note that for its fth Assessment
Report (AR5), the IPCC has adopted Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) for climate modelling and research. See: IPCC (2013), Summary for
Policymakers. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [Stocker, T.F.; Qin, D.; Plattner, G.-K.; Tignor, M.; Allen, S.K.; Boschung, J.; Nauels, A.; Xia, Y.; Bex, V.; and Midgley, P.M. (eds.)]. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, United States.
4
Shamouta, M. Nouar and Lahn, Glada. “The Euphrates in Crisis: Channels of Cooperation.” Chatham House: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 2014.
Access at < https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150413Euphrates_0.pdf>
5
"Climate change in Iraq." Relief Web. 2012. Access at <
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Climate%20change%20In%20Iraq%20Fact%20sheet%20-%20English.pdf> .
6
IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change [Solomon, S.; Qin, D.; Manning, M.; Chen, Z.; Marquis, M.; Averyt, K.B.; Tignor, M.; and Miller,
H.L. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, United States. Note that for its fth Assessment
Report (AR5), the IPCC has adopted Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) for climate modelling and research. See: IPCC (2013), Summary for
Policymakers. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [Stocker, T.F.; Qin, D.; Plattner, G.-K.; Tignor, M.; Allen, S.K.; Boschung, J.; Nauels, A.; Xia, Y.; Bex, V.; and Midgley, P.M. (eds.)]. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, United States.
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the cropland declined, and livestock was decimated; more than 100,000 people were displaced
from the northern governorates as a result.7 Two years later, the high level of salinity in Iraq’s
Shatt Al-Arab — a river formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates located in Iraq’s
southern governorate of Basra — forced hundreds of families to abandon their land.8 The impact
of climate change on water resources is an important factor on displacement in Iraq.

While climate has always been an important factor in movement and settlement patterns,9 forced
movements vary in severity, frequency, and pattern depending on the change.10 People may
move as a result of sudden environmental disasters or slow-onset environmental changes; these
movements can be cyclical or permanent.11 The most often quoted number of the anticipated
influx of environmentally-induced migrants is from Myers, who predicts that 200 million
individuals will be displaced by 2025.12 This number has also been cited by the Stern Review
and the IPCC.13 Rapid changes in the environment and subsequent resource scarcity will not only
produce economic migrants — those moving due to the loss of their livelihoods14 — but will also
cause conflict-related displacement, as it has in Bangladesh, Senegal, Mauritania, the
Philippines, and El Salvador, among other counties.15 Africa and Asia will be the most impacted

7

Ibid; "Climate change in Iraq." Relief Web. 2012. Access at <
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Climate%20change%20In%20Iraq%20Fact%20sheet%20-%20English.pdf> .
8
"Climate change in Iraq." Relief Web. 2012. Access at <
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Climate%20change%20In%20Iraq%20Fact%20sheet%20-%20English.pdf> .
9
For example: Lakota of the North American Plains prior to European settlement, pastoralist nomadic societies. Read more in
Brown, Oli. “Climate change and forced migration: Observation, projections and implications.” UNDP. 2007. Access at <
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/brown_oli.pdf>.
10
Brown, Oli. “Climate change and forced migration: Observation, projections and implications.” UNDP. 2007. Access at <
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/brown_oli.pdf>
11
Ibid.
12
Myers, Norma. “Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st Century.” Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 357, no. 1420 (2002): 609-613.
13
IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B.
Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA; Nicholas Stern, “The Economics of Climate Change,” Brown University.
14
Ibid
15
Aydogan, Hakan, “Environmental Scarcity and Global Security” The Assessment of Environment Related Conflicts in Bangladesh, Senegal-Mauritania, Philippines
and El Salvador.” European Scientific Journal Match 1, no. 8 (2015): 1857-7881.
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by climate change, which will cause large movements of people. 16 Thus, the effect of climate
change on displacement is an urgent contemporary topic meriting further academic study.

Though environmental change is one of the largest generators of human displacement, there is
remarkably little knowledge and work about its complexity and multivariate process.17 This is
especially true of the Arab region and Iraq in particular. To help fill this knowledge gap, this
thesis addresses one of the most pressing environmental issues facing Iraq—water security and
its links to displacement. This thesis argues that water issues in Iraq continue to cause significant
displacement in the country’s southern region and, in addition to local factors, international and
transnational factors contribute to scarcity and displacement as well. For effective policymaking, more attention needs to be paid to how national, international, and transnational factors
operate alongside and in relation to each other. Effective policy-making also needs to understand
how displaced persons perceive these factors because their lived experiences often differ from
institutionalized international narratives on resource management. In particular, policy-making
on displacement tends to neglect water-related causes not only in Iraq but globally. And even
when addressed, policy-making places undue emphasis on local and national causes without
appreciating the relationship between internal and external factors. Ultimately, policy-making
will be more effective at all levels by better understanding the water-related reasons for
displacement in the national, international, and transnational contexts in an interrelated way.

16

Ibid.
Boano, Carmillo, Roger Zetter, and Tim Morris. “Environmentally displaced people: understanding the linkages between environmental change, livelihoods and
forced migration.” Refugee Studies Centre. 2008. Access at < https://www.unicef.org/spanish/socialpolicy/files/Environmentally_displaces_people.pdf>.
17
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Methodology
This thesis utilizes secondary sources on causes of water scarcity and its implications on the
displacement of animal herders and farmers whose livelihoods have become threatened by the
increasing severity and of abrupt nature of weather conditions. The secondary research provides
background information and data on water issues in Iraq, historical events, and climate change.

The thesis also includes fieldwork to understand how displaced communities, policy makers and
civil society groups in southern Iraq perceive the causes of water scarcity that are forcing people
to move. Of the five southern Iraqi governorates, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Basra, Missan, Najef, Al
Qadyysiah, fieldwork included three—Dhi Qar, Al Qadyysiah and Missan. These three
governorates were selected because they are located on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers: Dhi Qar
and Al Qadyysiah rely on the flow of the Euphrates, while Missan relies on the Tigris before it
flows into the Shatt Al-Arab. In addition, these three governorates have experienced the largest
numbers of environmentally-induced displacement, and they were also the safest to visit during
the time of fieldwork. These governorates are within the region of southern Iraq and have the
same climatic characteristics.

The fieldwork was six weeks long and it took place between November 28, 2017 to January 7. It
consisted of participant observation, semi-structured interviews and content analysis of original
documents and data from Iraq’s Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Water Resources.
The semi-structured interviews were conducted with 58 persons who have been displaced or face
the threat of displacement due to water scarcity; 3 members of civil society groups, primarily
10

Nature Iraq;18 and 9 local government officials in each governorate. Officials interviewed were
all Directors employed in either the Directorate of Water Resources, the Directorate of
Environment, or the Directorate of Agriculture. The snowballing method was used for collecting
data within the communities and I spent around a week and a half in each governorate. The
reason for selecting the Directorate of Water Resources, Directorate of Agriculture and the
Directorate of Environment is because they all are involved on a local level in the decisionmaking process on water issues and work together to manage water resources in Iraq.

The purpose of this fieldwork is to provide an understanding of how those who are directly
affected by water scarcity perceive the causes of the scarcity, and how officials who are working
on policies related to water and the environment perceive water scarcity. These perceptions are
analyzed alongside international perceptions of water scarcity in Iraq. Furthermore, perceptions
are compared with data on the various internal, transnational and international factors that impact
water scarcity in order to identify knowledge gaps and policy-making consequences. In
particular, this fieldwork examines how the gap between displaced communities’ understandings
of climate change and that of policymakers’ differ, thus limiting the impact of the latter’s
attempts to prevent further displacement.

Conceptual Framework
There are two main concepts that this thesis relies upon: Linton’s concept of “hydroelectics”,19
and Chimni’s theory of the imperial global state. Both these concepts are used to analyze
displacement in Iraq related to water scarcity. Linton’s concept of “hydroelectics” provides a

18
19

Nature Iraq is a non-profit organization that operates throughout Iraq. It is mainly run by Iraqis.
Linton, Jamie. What Is Water? The History of a Modern Abstraction. Vol. 1. Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2010.
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bottom-up approach to analyzing the perceptions of individuals, communities, and local
decision-makers. Chimni’s theory of the global imperial state is a top-down approach,
particularly useful to understand what happened in Iraq following the 2003 War reforms,
particularly in the water sector, and how these changes impacted the perceptions and knowledge
about water among policymakers at various levels of governance from the global to the national
to the local. These concepts are employed together as the insights they provide are
complimentary, together providing a comprehensive and holistic examination of the causes of
water scarcity and their link with displacement in southern Iraq.

Linton argues that the modern concept of water strips water of its environmental, social and
cultural context, reducing it to a scientific abstract that obfuscates the bigger picture, which is
that every issue involving water is realized in a specific social and cultural context.20 This
abstraction of water has given modern society the right to dam, divert and manipulate water with
impunity. More importantly, the local community’s knowledge about water is left out of
hydraulic projects and local stakeholders are mostly ignored.21 This normalizes the manipulation
of water resources and the social implications it has on communities, such as population
displacement. Linton outlines the practice of social hydrology, which he calls “hydroelectics,”
which maintains that knowledge about water is a product related to social circumstances and
modes of knowledge: “water is what we make of it.”22 He further concludes that the solution to
the water crisis involves rethinking water in terms of its social content.23 This thesis employs
Linton’s concept of “hydroelectics” to analyze the difference between how displaced

20

Ibid
Ibid
22
Linton, Jamie. What Is Water? The History of a Modern Abstraction. Vol. 1. Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2010. Pg. 3
23
Ibid
21
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communities perceive the causes of water scarcity–the driver of their displacement—and
policymakers whose knowledge of water scarcity in Iraq, I argue, reflects not the knowledge of
the communities but the discourse of international entities. As a result of this, Iraqi policymakers
don’t appreciate the complexity and nuances of water scarcity, and how it impacts displacement
in their local communities.

The thesis also engages with Chimni’s work in analyzing policymakers’ perceptions of water and
how their knowledge about water is produced. Chimni stipulates that international institutions
help further the interests of powerful states and an emerging transnational capitalist class by
increasing the power and influence of corporations at the expense of third world peoples.24 In the
case of Iraq, this was done through reforms imposed after a coalition of countries invaded Iraq in
2003. Relying on Chimni’s analytical framework, I argue that displaced communities’
knowledge of water is excluded in policy making and water management. Policymakers’
perceptions instead reflect the water management discourse of international organizations,
resulting in abstracting water from its local social and environmental context and excluding the
voices of local communities in southern Iraq and instead favoring the interests of corporate
actors that profit from control of water.

Thesis Outline
Chapter One describes the link between climate change and displacement, providing background
on the literature on environmentally-induced displacement and the different environmental
factors that contribute to displacement. Chapter Two provides a background on water in southern

24

Chimni, B.S. “International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making.” European Journal of International Law 15, no. 1 (2004): 1-37. Pg. 14-15.

13

Iraq, outlining the internal, international and transnational factors that have impacted water in the
past and changed the main rivers’ courses. This Chapter does not provide a comprehensive
historical review but rather examine historical events relevant to water and displacement.
Chapter Three considers water and displacement in post-2003 Iraq, analyzing the
commercialization and privatization of water in the era of globalization and focusing on the
interplay between international and transnational factors in managing water in. This chapter
engages with Chimni’s work to show how post-2003 neoliberal policy has promoted the interests
of the private sector and, in turn, impacted water quality and displacement in Iraq.

Chapter Four details fieldwork conducted between November 2017 to January 2018. All the
details are outlined in the annex. Chapter Four reports on the perceptions of the current issues of
water scarcity in Iraq, in particular the discrepancies between the perceptions of the displaced
communities and civil society groups, and policymakers. It explains the methodology used for
the fieldwork and includes the profiles of the areas and groups studied. Chapter Five builds on
the fieldwork and existing literature on water scarcity in Iraq to examine the difference between
perceptions and actual data. The chapter engages with Linton and Chimni’s concepts to analyze
perceptions of water scarcity. It argues that displaced communities whose livelihoods are directly
impacted by water scarcity have a certain social relationship with water, the context in which
their hydro-social relationship is produced. This social understanding of water influences how
communities perceive water scarcity. I conclude that in order for Iraq to address water scarcity
and the resultant displacement, it needs to listen to those most impacted; and consider the
confluence of international, transnational and local causal factors holistically when engaging in
policy-making.
14

Chapter One: Environmentally-Induced Displacement
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on environmentally-induced displacement. It
describes the three main issues that have sparked interest among scholars on this topic: the
definition of environmentally-induced displacement, links between environmental degradation
and displacement, and institutional and legal protection mechanisms for people displaced as a
result of environmental conditions. My purpose is to highlight some of the complexity and
nuance in the field of environmentally-induced displacement.

Anthropogenic, or man-made, climate change is one of the biggest challenges facing humanity.
Scientific studies observe that post-industrial rise in greenhouse gases are the dominate cause of
global warming that is causing significant changes in physical and biological systems on all
continents and in most oceans at a rapid rate.25 The significant rise in the greenhouse gasses
since the post-industrial era are a result of human activities are such as fossil fuel extraction and
land use, mainly deforestation and agriculture. 26 Generally, between 45 to 57 per cent has been
absorbed by the atmosphere and the remaining greenhouse gases have been absorbed by the
ocean and land biosphere.27 The greenhouse gases that absorbed are causing significant warming
in the global climate.28 This global warming which is largely attributed to western-led industrial

25

IPCC (2007), Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change [Solomon, S.; Qin, D.; Manning, M.; Chen, Z.; Marquis, M.; Averyt, K.B.; Tignor, M.; and Miller,
H.L. (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, United States. Note that for its fth Assessment
Report (AR5), the IPCC has adopted Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) for climate modelling and research. See: IPCC (2013), Summary for
Policymakers. Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change [Stocker, T.F.; Qin, D.; Plattner, G.-K.; Tignor, M.; Allen, S.K.; Boschung, J.; Nauels, A.; Xia, Y.; Bex, V.; and Midgley, P.M. (eds.)]. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, United States.
26
Scientific models differ in measuring the amount of CO2 absorbed, and thus, and the results of how much has been absorbed by the planet vs the atmosphere is
different. “The Missing Carbon Sink.” The Environmental Literacy Council. Access at <https://enviroliteracy.org/air-climate-weather/climate/the-missing-carbonsink/>.
27
Rahmstorf, Stefan. “Anthropogenic Climate Change: Revisiting the Facts” in ed. Ernesto Zedillo Global Warming: Looking Beyond Kyoto (Yale Center for the
Study of Globalization and Sciences-Po, Paris, Brookings Institution Press, 2008) 34-54.
28
Ibid.
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development model will have significant and disproportionate impact on the global South
rending areas uninhabitable and resulting in extreme and unpredictable weather events.29

The magnitude of the impact of global warming as well as the unpredictability and complexity
that accompanies it has sparked interest among scholars across disciplines. During the 1970s and
1980s, experts working on environmental change began studying the implications of
environmental degradation on human displacement, which in turn played an important role in
drawing the attention of the international community to the gravity of the issue.30 While there has
been growing literature on environmental issues and displacement since then, the subject remains
understudied, fragmented, and in need of more robust evidence.31

Scholars disagree on the definition of environmentally-induced displacement and protection
mechanisms for displaced populations. There is general consensus that there are two main types
of climatic events that cause displacement: rapid-onset events, such as extreme and short-term
weather conditions; and slow-onset ones such as those that exacerbate desertification and rising
sea levels.32 The type of displacement caused by environmental change, particularly slow-onset
events, is likely to be permanent. Individuals’ returns to their places of origin are improbable as
land slowly becomes uninhabitable and in some cases, disappear.33 Jane McAdam theorizes that
while a small number of people will cross borders, the majority of environmentally-related

29

Brock, Hannah. “Climate Change: Drivers of Insecurity and the Global South.” Oxford Research Goup. 2012. Access by
<http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/Climate%20Change%20and%20Insecurity%20in%20the%20Global%20South.pdf>.
30
Gomez, Oscar, “Climate change and migration: a review of the literature.” International Institute of Social Studies, The Hague (Erasmus University Rotterdam).
2013. Access by < http://www.shram.org/uploadFiles/20170519024801.pdf>.
31
Raleigh, C. “The search for safety: the effects of conflict, poverty and ecological influences on migration in the developing world.” Global Environmental Change
21, no. 1 (2011): Pg. 82-93; Bardsley, DK. and Graeme J. Hugo, “Migration and climate change: examining thresholds of change to guide effective adaptation
decision-making.“Population and Environment 32, no. 2 & 3 (2010):238-262; Gray, Clark and Richard Bilsborrow. “Environmental Influences on Human Migration
in Rural Ecuador.” Demography 4 (2013): 1217–1241.
32
Brown, Oli and Alec Crawford, “Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Climate Change and the Risk of Violent Conflict in the Middle East” International Institute
for Sustainable Development. 2009. Access at < http://www.iisd.org/library/rising-temperatures-rising-tensions-climate-change-and-risk-violent-conflict-middle-east>
33
Ibid.
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displacement is likely to be internal.34 More specifically, movement will be centered in the
global South, in the rural areas of Africa and Asia. These two continents will be the most
impacted by climate change and thus will witness the largest movements.35 The estimated
number of people who are predicted to be environmentally displaced is staggering. In 1995,
Myers projected that there were at least 25 million “environmental refugees” existing already
and predicted that a total of 200 million individual would be displaced by 2025.36 This figure has
been quoted repeatedly in reports and peer-reviewed journals.37 Repetition, of course, doesn’t
make numbers accurate.38 Myers himself indicated that the data, while calculated from the best
available data, requires “heroic extrapolations”, evidencing the challenges of conducting research
in this area.39 The next two sections respectively consider the terminology, and the link between
environmental issues and displacement.

Terminology
The debate on how to identify those displaced for environmental reasons is ongoing. Scholars
and institutions differ in how they define and categorize environmental displacement. On the one
hand, there is a growing body of literature that views population movement linked to the
environment as “migration.” Among the most cited and widely encompassing definitions is that
of the International Organization of Migration (IOM), which defines environmental migrants as:
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Persons or groups who, for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely
affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either
temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad.40

IOM’s definition encompasses different kinds of environmental displacement. Another important
institutional definition from the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) defines environmentallydisplaced people as those “who are displaced from or who feel obliged to leave their usual place
of residence, because their lives, livelihoods and welfare have been placed at serious risk as a
result of adverse environmental, ecological or climatic processes and events.”41 The agency has
been cautious in its definition, avoiding any reference to “refugee” or cross-border movement. It
has also avoided reference to displacement related to persecution, armed conflict or human rights
violations. This definition operates within UNHCR’s mandate, which has expanded to include
internal displacement particularly that resulting from sudden environmental disasters.

On the other hand, scholars like El-Hinnawi, Myers and Kent use the term “environmental
refugees” rather than “migrants” to describe the movement.42 Myers affirms El-Hinnawi’s
position and describes environmentally-displaced people as “persons who no longer gain a
secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of what are primarily environmental
factors of unusual scope.”43 For Myers, the term “refugees” captures the nature and severity of
environmental movement.
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Recently, scholars of migration have critiqued and steered away from using the term “refugee,”
recognizing its narrow legal definition entrenched in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees. They see the term “refugee” as ill-fit for environmentally-displaced people,
especially those who move due to slow-onset climatic events.44 In particular, Castels and Lee
have critiqued El-Hannawi’s notion of “environmental refugees” as being poorly-defined and
consequently legally meaningless and confusing.45 Richard Black reaffirms this view. He is a
trenchant opponent of the concept of “environmental refugee” and prefers to use the terms
“migration,” “movement” or a “customary coping strategy.”46

Unlike Black, Castel and Lee, Bates takes a more nuanced approach and argues that depending
on the kind of displacement, the term “environmental refugees” is appropriate. She argues that
those displaced by disasters and expropriation of land have limited control over their decision to
move and can thus be called “environmental refugees.” Furthermore, Bates posits that
displacement as a result of a gradual degradation of the environment should be referred to as
“environmental migration” due to the long, slow-onset process that gives people time to plan for
movement and is thus not forced.47

Dun also recognizes the complexity of defining environmental migrants and largely attributes
this complexity to the difficulty in isolating environmental factors from other drivers of
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migration. Dun’s concern is that the most anticipated environment-related displacement is slowonset change, which impacts people’s livelihoods and causes them stress. As such,
environmental factors are contributing factors rather than the major factor in movement, thus
making it difficult to establish direct causality and formulate a definition.

Link between Displacement and Environmental Change
A more contentious debate than how to identify and define the people who are displaced by
environmental change is the linkage between displacement and an increasingly changing
environment. There are two isolated schools of thoughts that are generally cited: the “alarmists”
and the “skeptics.”48 The former, which includes Myers, Shurke and El-Hinnawi, and Bates
insist on denoting environmental change as a major driving force of migration. For them,
environmental issues force people to move, and there is an urgent and exacerbating crisis of
environment-related displacement that must be addressed. The skeptics, however, look at the
complexity of the link between movement and environmental issues. Two skeptics, Castels and
Lee, find that migration is a complex pattern in which natural and environmental factors are
closely linked to economic, social and political ones in terms of causality.49

With regard to slow-onset environmental degradation, displacement is linked to the depletion of
both land and water resources, deforestation, desertification and pollution. The IPCC has noted
that the greatest effect of climate change may be on human migration as millions of people are
displaced due to slow-onset environmental change such as shoreline erosion, coastal flooding
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and agricultural disruption.50 Brown argues that all of these rapidly changing climatic conditions
will erode livelihoods, likely causing population movement by making certain parts of the world
less viable places to live. In these conditions, migration can be seasonal, circular, permanent or
temporary, depending on the nature and severity of the environmental conditions.

As the world is expected to be, on average, between 1.8 and 4 degrees Celsius hotter in 2099,
slow-onset environmental changes such as decreased rainfall and increased heatwaves are
expected to occur with increasing severity. 51 The rising of sea levels and the flooding of coastal
communities will have severe implications on food security and economic growth.52 Myers
anticipates a one-meter rise in sea levels to displace anywhere between 13 to 40 million
individuals.53 According to the IPCC’s fourth assessment report, agricultural production also will
be severely compromised as growing seasons and yield potentials are expected to decrease.
Farmers in the Sahel region of Africa living in warmer and drier conditions have already
curtailed their cropping seasons.54 The IPCC predicts a 50 per cent decrease in rain-fed
agriculture in certain parts of Africa by 2020 and a 30 per cent decrease in agriculture yields in
Central and South Asia by 2050.55 These insecurities will likely push people to migrate for
improved livelihoods.
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The implications of climate change for population movement are more straightforward when it
comes to sudden weather events such as hurricanes and typhoons. Brown argues that natural
disasters could displace large numbers of people for relatively short periods of time, but the
slow-onset drivers are likely to permanently displace more people. A 2014 study by the Oxford
Refugee Center found that environmental vulnerability in Kenya, Ghana and Vietnam resulting
from great climatic variations has increased internal and external displacement. Ghana and
Kenya have witnessed widespread and frequent droughts, floods and strong storms that have led
to large-scale population displacement. Between 1982 and 2008, around 4 million people were
affected by droughts in Kenya. Vietnam is particularly threatened by rising sea levels and saline
water intrusion, especially given that a large proportion of the population lives in low elevation
coastal zones. Furthermore, the Mekong Delta accounts for 50 per cent of Vietnam’s rice
production and a larger proportion of its fishing production.56 As mentioned in my Introduction,
climate change in Iraq has produced severe and frequent droughts in recent years, which have
threatened thousands of people, particularly farmers and animal herders in the southern region.

In addition to the notion that environmental degradation and dwindling natural resources cause a
loss of livelihoods and subsequent migration, Kolmannskog and Trebbi argue that sudden-onset
and slow-onset natural disasters can trigger conflict through competition over scarce resources.57
For example, UNEP listed the erosion of natural resources caused by climate change among the
root causes of the Darfur tragedy. Drastic declines in rainfall had turned grazing land into desert,
destroying the livelihoods of pastoralist societies and forcing them to move further south to find

56

Roger Zetter and James Morrissey, “Environmental stress, displacement and the challenge of rights protection,” Forced Migration Review 45, (2014): 65-71.
Kolmannskog, Vikram and Lisetta Trebbi, “Climate change, natural disasters and displacement: a multi-track approach to filling the protection gaps,” International
Review of the Red Cross, 92, no. 879 (2010): 713-730.
57

22

new pastures. They moved to areas already populated with other communities, creating tensions
over dwindling resources, and contributing to eventual conflict.
On the other hand, Black is skeptical of the notion that environmental degradation is increasingly
at the root of conflicts that induce refugee flows; arguing that, since the 1990s, conflicts that
have caused large-scale forced migration provide little evidence of environmental “hotspots’’
that developed into war. In fact, he contends that conflicts are over controlling abundant wealthcreating natural resources.58 For Black, it’s difficult to isolate migration from broader contexts in
which conflict is created. Thus, a simple causal link between environmental degradation, conflict
and migration is unlikely to be found.
As Brown emphasizes, alongside climatic factors, equally important are the non-climatic factors
that condition a community’s vulnerability to climate change, including its exposure to climatic
conditions and the community’s adaptive capacity. Migration requires financial and social
capital. Therefore, communities do not choose to immediately migrate when their environment
changes but they find alternative ways of adopting to environmental changes. When all options
are exhausted, they migrate. Lonergan agrees and further adds that only through a structural
understanding of the environment’s political and cultural context in a region or country can “one
begin to understand the “role” [the degradation of the environment] plays as a factor in
population movement.”59 In other words, the implications of environmental change on different
countries varies and the displacement it may induce depends on the country’s political, economic
and social context. McLeman and Smit add that it is necessary to question whether a community
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has adaptive strategies when vulnerable to climate change. If communities or their institutions
are unable to cope with a changed environment, individuals remain vulnerable, and may be
obliged to implement their own adaptive strategies including migration.60

As Germenne argues, migration can be viewed as a coping strategy to adapt to climate change.
People who are affected by changing weather conditions will have to leave their environments
that are no longer suitable in search of new ones.61 Brown asserts that rural to urban migration
can hinder a community’s development and resilience to climate change by exerting pressure on
urban infrastructures and services and undermining economic growth. This can increase the risk
of conflict and lead to deteriorating health and social indicators among migrants themselves.

Water Scarcity and Displacement
Displacement scenarios that are linked to water problems consist of both sudden-onset disasters
and slow-onset environmental events. On the one hand, sudden-onset events such as monsoon
floods, glacial lake outburst floods, storms, hurricanes and typhoons force people out of their
land quickly and dramatically.62 Examples of these events include hurricanes Katrina and Rita
which hit the Gulf Coast of the US in August and September 2005 forcing around two million
people out of their homes.63 One the other hand, slow-onset events which include rising sea
levels, salinization of freshwater and arable land, dwindling water resources, and droughts
displace people sporadically and more permanently than sudden-onset even, over longer periods
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of times.64 In the case of the Horn of Africa, erratic and below average rainfall has resulted in
widespread water and food insecurity and deteriorating livestock conditions forcing thousands of
people to be displaced, within and across borders. Droughts and subsequent food insecurity in
Somalia have been linked to the displacement of nearly 700,000 people internally and 2,000
Somalis have crossed the Somali borders to neighboring Kenya in 2017.65 In cases of droughts
and desertification, people will have no choice but to leave their homes. While there is a tipping
point for these slow-onset disasters, many people decide to leave in anticipation of the worse-tocome and to improve their economic situation.66 Further, drivers to migrate, internally or
internationally, are infused with other vulnerabilities, such as poverty and issues of
underdevelopment. Displacement as a result of water-related issues can occur at different stages
of climate change and in different ways.

Environmental degradation and displacement should be understood as interrelated phenomena
caused by multiple international, internal and transnational factors. These factors interplay with
preexisting vulnerabilities such as development capacity and poverty, which exacerbate and
expedite the depletion of natural resource such as water. It is indeed, as Burkett argues, hard to
“‘[T]ease out’ climate impacts from other input with complete precision”.67
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Available data on environmental degradation and migration insufficiently explain the link
between displacement and environmental issues and make appropriate responses difficult.68
More data and research that unpacks the complexity of environmentally-induced displacement is
needed. To contribute to the understanding of this phenomena, this thesis examines
environmentally-induced displacement by examining the issue of water scarcity in southern Iraq
to emphasize the complexities of environmental change and displacement, looking at local,
transnational and international causal factors and how they interplay.
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Chapter Two: A Brief History of Water in Lower Mesopotamia from Ancient
Times to the Present Day
Introduction
This Chapter traces the history of water resources in southern Iraq from ancient Mesopotamia to
modern times. It provides a historical background, describing how the water situation in Iraq had
periodically been linked with displacement through climate change, urbanization, internal water
management policies, and as such contemporary challenges are not wholly unprecedented.

On the Tigris and the Euphrates
Southern Iraq is home to the earliest civilization in the world: Sumer.69 The region,
Mesopotamia, or the land between the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers takes its name from two
Greek words, Mesos meaning ‘middle’ and potamos for ‘river.70 Geographically, Mesopotamia is
the land between the Zagros and Anti-Tarus mountains in the north and the Arabian plateau and
the Arab-Persian Gulf to the south.71 The focus of this Chapter, lower Mesopotamia, extends
from Nippur (94 miles to the south of modern day Baghdad) to Ur and the Arab-Persian Gulf
(see Map 1 for a close-up of lower Mesopotamia).
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Map 1 Lower Mesopotamian Civilization highlighting ancient cities and present-day
governorates 72

The Euphrates and Tigris basin originates in one climatic zone and ends in a different one.73
Both rivers arise out of the mountains of southern Turkey and meet in extensive lowlands in the
south and east of the Arab-Persian Gulf. The Euphrates River is formed by the confluence of the
Kara Su or Western Euphrates and the Murat Su or Eastern Euphrates in southeastern Turkey,
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while the Tigris River rises amid the snow-covered Taurus Mountains of eastern Turkey.74 When
the two rivers emerge from the Taurus Mountains in southern Turkey, they are separated from
each other by about 400 km and meet again at Al-Qurnah, 100 km north of Basra to form, along
with the Karun River, Shatt Al-Arab, as show in Map 2.75

Map 2 The Tigris and Euphrates Basin from where they rise in Turkey to Shatt Al-Arab where
the two rivers meet 76
In lower Mesopotamia, the two rivers flow at a low gradient; as a result, numerous side branches
form and the rivers overflow creating permanent lakes and marshes and occasionally changing
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their courses.77 While data on when and in what ways the shape of lower Mesopotamia has
changed overtime is inconclusive, archeological evidence show that before 14,000 B.C. the two
rivers reached the Gulf separately.78 In the past, the shoreline was situated more than 200 sq. km
farther inland than it is today.79 However, at the height of the last Ice Age, global sea levels
began to rise beginning around 14,000 B.C. and the alluvium deposited by the rivers gradually
enlarged the deltas of the two rivers which led to the growth of the rivers’ deltas leading to their
merging in Shatt Al-Arab.80 The next section explores the ways in which the rivers were used in
ancient Mesopotamia, and how one of the oldest and most complex irrigation systems was
developed in lower Mesopotamia.

The Ancient Crucible: Lower Mesopotamia
Mesopotamia’s history is deeply linked with water. The two rivers shaped the society of ancient
Mesopotamia, especially its southern part (see Map 3). The large environmental differences
between northern and lower Mesopotamia divided ancient Mesopotamia into two parts: the
northern plain of Assyria characterized by mountains and an arid climate and the southern
Babylonian alluvium.81 Lower Mesopotamia is described as an alluvial plain where irrigationbased agriculture developed and flourished. This irrigation system supported a large agricultural
community that led to the formation of the first city-states in the world around 6000 years ago.82
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The Rise of Lower Mesopotamia (around 6,500 to 3,000 B.C.)
Lower Mesopotamia was essentially formed by huge deposits of silt carried by the Euphrates and
the Tigris Rivers. As a vast flood plain, the region faced constant floods between April and June
that were too late for winter crops and too early for summer ones.83 The climate in the region
was dry and received little rainfall to enrich the soils despite its flat plains. In order to ensure
appropriate water supply to the agricultural fields, a complex and intricate system of canals and
dykes was developed by ancient Sumerians to control water and adapt to their environment.84
Mesopotamia’s well-documented archaeological and textual record on ancient water reveals that
states between the sixth and the first millennium B.C. in ancient Mesopotamia had heavy
involvement in irrigation and water management.85 Irrigation in lower Mesopotamia provided
subsistence for small communities and later became the economic basis for states and empire.86
Archeological studies show that throughout the history of Mesopotamia, natural causes and the
states’ manipulations of Mesopotamia’s irrigation system impacted lower Mesopotamia’s water
resources and its people.87

During the Ubaid period (around 6,500 to 3,800 B.C.), villages and small towns grew where
irrigation agriculture was controlled by small, temple-centered societies with little centralization
of agricultural surplus. The following Uruk period (around 4,000 to 3,000 B.C.) marks a
transition from chiefdom to state whereby urbanization flourished in Sumer.88 Large scale
agricultural communities began to emerge moving beyond just subsistence farming by producing
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surpluses, diversifying social and economic activities, and living in large numbers of collective
communities.89 Notably, the emergence of these cities was dependent upon nearness to a
dependable water supply and trade routes. During the Uruk period, the Sumerians built the cities
of Erudi, Kish, Lagash, Nippur, Ur, Uruk and Susa, giving rise to the Sumerian civilization.90
Sumer was located in the southern part of lower Mesopotamia, stretching 50 miles south of
modern day Baghdad to Basra.91 By 3,000 B.C., the Sumerians had established a civilization
with thriving urban centers. An integral part of the Sumerians ability to establish these centers
was their highly developed and well-maintained irrigation system and water management
techniques (see Map 3 to identify Mesopotamian cities and watercourses). Cities of lower
Mesopotamia were characterized by a highly organized and efficient agricultural system
supported by their irrigation network. People and their agricultural production faced massive
regional drought and man-made diversion of water courses during the following periods, that left
many lower Mesopotamian cities abandoned and induced displacement.
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Map 3 Mesopotamia 3200-1800 B.C., identifying the different environmental regions, probable
watercourse and coastline, and the location of contemporary towns. 92

Droughts, Displacement and the Collapse of the Akkadian Empire (around 2324 to 2206 B.C.)
The first empire that consolidated power throughout Mesopotamia was the Akkadian empire.
The Akkadian Empire ruled Mesopotamia from the headwater of the Euphrates and the Tigris to
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the Arab-Persian Gulf during the late 3rd millennium B.C.93 The Akkadian Empire was able to
expand in lower Mesopotamia by controlling, managing and governing Mesopotamian irrigation
systems, especially lower Mesopotamia.94 The empire sustained itself and thrived economically
on long-distance trade and massive agricultural projects sustained by a large network of
irrigation canals. The Akkadian military power was large and strong, bolstering distant imperial
fortresses and repressing rebellions locally.95 An abrupt and severe drought, however, caused the
collapse of the Akkadian Empire based in lower Mesopotamia. This severe drought desiccated
agriculture landscape of the Mediterranean, West Asia and Mesopotamia.96 Reduction in water
flow greatly diminished canal length and irrigated field areas in lower Mesopotamia. Scholars
have attributed this drought to an abrupt and severe change in climate conditions. DeMenocal
explains that, “[T]here was an influence of the North Atlantic Oscillation on the stream flow of
the Tigris and Euphrates at this time, which led to the collapse of the Akkadian Empire.”97 Water
levels within the Tigris and Euphrates fell 1.5 meters below the levels of 2600 B.C.98 Weiss
argues that the drought and loss of agricultural land led to massive displacement in lower
Mesopotamia, and the departure of most of the population in the region. As a result, “major
urban settlements and their surrounding towns and villages were abandoned synchronously and
completely.”99 This period was followed by an approximately 250-year abandonment of the
region, until the return of the pre-drought precipitation.100 This population movement in lower
Mesopotamia and the subsequent population doubling following the drought generated the
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hypertrophic Ur III dynasty cities along the Euphrates River where urban settlement flourished
once again.101

Resettlement and Water Resource Management in Ancient Lower Mesopotamia (around 2094 to
around 1340 B.C.)
Water management was an integral component of governance in ancient Mesopotamia and the
re-establishment of the cities after the Akkadian Empire collapse. Governing and managing
watercourses and the overall irrigation system was an integral part of governing the growing
cities in lower Mesopotamia, especially since water was treated as a communal, rather than an
individual asset.102

During the Ur III period (around 2113 to around 2006 B.C.), the best documented era in
antiquity, lower Mesopotamia had one of the most efficient and well-managed water systems in
the world to date.103 Archaeological evidence shows that at the time of the Ur III period and
throughout Mesopotamian history in general, arable land was nominally owned by the state;
private ownership was of marginal importance, albeit not ruled out.104 The management of arable
land and water infrastructure was managed directly by local state institutions in a centralized
manner with a hierarchy of administrators.105 This continued under the rule of Hammurabi (1792
to 1750 B.C.), the sixth king of the first Babylonian Dynasty, who united all of the Sumerian
cities were united with Babylon as their capital. During the time of Hammurabi, irrigation system
was prosperous. Controlling water courses and maintaining the water management was
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particularly critical for maintaining the most important religious and administrative centers. He
undertook major dredging on the Euphrates River channels to restore water flow to cities
following the droughts and was directly involved in the management of the rivers’ water
supply.106

One of the ways in which the irrigation system in Mesopotamia was governed was through
irrigation and water laws. Mesopotamia developed a system of customary and established water
laws to manage its watercourse and impose of liability upon those who failed to safeguard
irrigation canals, and thereby causing flood damage.107 Hammurabi formulated 300 codes which
dealt with different aspects of irrigation. An illustrative example of these codes addresses the
maintenance of the canals:
If a man is negligent in strengthening the banks of this field and has not maintained his banks and
then a breach has occurred in this bank and so he has let the waters carry away (the soil on) the
waterland, the man in whose bank the breach has occurred shall replace the corn which he has
(caused to be) lost.108

While the irrigation system and water was well-maintained during the Hammurabi era, diversion
of water courses and subsequent droughts threatened the land and people in certain parts of lower
Mesopotamia once again in the later years. During the first Sealand Dynasty (1739-1340 B.C),
the Tigris River was dammed somewhere south of Mashkan-Shapir (30 km north of Nippur and
140 km southeast of modern-day Baghdad) in response to rebellions in the south. As a result, the
Tigris shifted its course east from Nippur and the alluvial plain between Nippur and Uruk was
mostly abandoned. The population abandoned their settlements, agricultural and irrigation
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activities creased as the canal systems collapsed, and silt and sand accumulated in the canals.109
The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers witnessed drastic changes during the first Sealand Dynasty as a
result of the damming. The Tigris and Euphrates river bed moved from the heart of the alluvial
plain. The Tigris moved to the east of Nippur and ran in a new course, while the Euphrates
flowed at the extreme western portion of the plain and flowed to the west of Uruk and Eridu.110
Controlling and manipulating water courses in Mesopotamia continued to be a critical tactic that
foreign invaders employed to assume control over lower Mesopotamia in the years to come. This
had detrimental implications on the land and people of lower Mesopotamia.

The Persian Empire, the Arabs, the Mongols and the Ottomans (539 B.C. to 1918)
The canal system in lower Mesopotamia faced ongoing upheavals and at times destruction as
invaders assumed control over Mesopotamia. The first Persian Empire, the Achaemenid,
extended from the Balkans and Eastern Europe in the west to the Indus Valley in the East.111
Between 226 to 637 A.D, the successors of the Persian Achaemenids, the Sasanian Dynasty of
Persia, assumed control over Mesopotamia.112 The irrigation system in Mesopotamia underwent
a major overhauled by the Sasanians and was comprised of a lattice of intersecting canals
enclosing a geometric basin.113 The Sasanians altered the canal system, specifically in the lower
Diyala Plain, by constructing two new large canal systems; the first was 50 km long stretching
from the right bank of the Diyala River and ending near Ukbara; the second one, the Nahrwan or
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Katul-I Kisrawi, supplemented the Diyala River flow with water from the Tigris at Dour.114 In
response to sprawling settlements alongside new canals, the Sasanians enacted a new pattern of
development resettling populations from the canals to new ‘virgin land’ close to Tell Abu Sarifa,
near Nippur.115

The Sasanian forces lost Mesopotamia to the Arab army. In 636 CE at the battle of Madar,
Sasanian forces completely lost southern Mesopotamia to the Arab army. 116 The Muslim Arabs,
specifically during the Abbasid Caliphate, who conquered lower Mesopotamia in 637 also paid
great attention to irrigation projects in lower Mesopotamia, such as those on the Nahrawan canal
on the Tigris and its branches.117 However, sedimentation in areas close to the Nahrawan and
unsuccessful irrigation attempts forced farmers to move farther along the water routes shifting
from areas near Nahrawan to areas farther away.118 Farmers’ livelihoods were threatened with
the disruption of the irrigation system and were forced to move to adjust to the changing water
conditions.

By 1258, the Mongols established their control over Baghdad and the south of it destroying
much of the physical structure of Baghdad and demolishing the highly developed irrigation
system. This led to a loss of agricultural life throughout lower Mesopotamia and had
implications on population movement.119 After the degradation of the canal system that was the
main source of wealth in Mesopotamia, the country became a scene of rivalry for domination
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between the Mongols, Persians and then the Ottoman Turks. Irrigation was to remain a neglected
field from the Mongol conquest in 1258. The irrigation system was restored in 1911 with
W.Willock’s report on irrigation development and the subsequent establishment of the
Department of Irrigation in 1918 which was tasked with designing and constructing new
irrigation projects.120

Britain Cruises in Mesopotamian Water
Throughout most of the 19th century, steamships became the main mechanism for British
imperialism in southern Iraq. In 1829, there was a renewed interest in establishing a route
between Britain and India that cuts across the Mediterranean and down the Euphrates River to
the Arab-Persian Gulf.121 This route would ease transport for the British between their Eastern
colonies and the West making it more logistically convenient for the British to colonize. At that
time, Iraq, for the British was a preemptive buffer zone protecting India from Russia and France.
Thus, the Tigris and Euphrates were means for both expanding trade and protecting British
colonies.

In the early 1800s, the British began conducting surveys in Mesopotamia including its canal
system to find possible routes through Mesopotamia “based upon a more extended and beneficial
commerce to [the British] and their eastern colonies, and to Arabia.”122 A British lieutenant, H.B
Lynch, established a commercial house in Baghdad and, subsequently, a river transport
enterprise on the Tigris. The Turkish Ottoman government in charge at the time of the
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establishment of the Lynch company allowed the British steamers to navigate the Euphrates
River for commercial purposes.

Navigating the Mesopotamian waters for economic, commercial and trade purposes, including
oil, was materialized in an agreement between the British and the Turks. An Anglo-Ottoman
agreement signed in 1913 legalized the concessions of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam
Navigation Company and formed the Ottoman River Navigation Company, under the leadership
of the Chairman of the British Indian Steam Navigation Company. The Company was given the
right to navigate, operate and survey the Mesopotamian rivers from the Arab-Persian Gulf to
northern Mesopotamia, and allowed the construction of the Baghdad Railway down to Basra.123
In 1914, a British naval ship penetrated Shatt Al-Arab, subjugated lower Mesopotamia, and
within less than 20 days occupied the entire strategic maritime city of Basra.124 This event
marked an end to Ottoman Mesopotamia and the beginning of the Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq
under the Mandate System.

Between 1914 to 1918, World War One took place between the world’s economic powers: the
Allies that consisted of European countries, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan,
and the Central Powers of Germany, Austria-Hungry, Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria.125 At the
end of World War One, the victorious Allied Powers met at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.
The territories that were under the sovereignty of the Ottoman and German Empires that had
been defeated in WWI were divided into three categories—A, B and C—based on their degree of
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“civilization” and distributed among the Allied powers.126 Iraq was regarded as an A category
and placed under the trusteeship of Britain as a mandate of the League of Nations.127

The Mandate System in Iraq (1921 to 1932)
Under the oversight of the League of Nation’s Permanent Mandate Commission, Britain was to
turn Iraq into a modern self-determinant state and promote “well-being and development.”128 In
doing so, while securing Britain’s economic and political interest, the British appointed Faisal
Ibn Hussein as King of Iraq in 1921 and proceeded to assume control through the Anglo-Iraqi
treaty129 over Iraq’s financial and military affairs as well as Iraq’s constitution.130 During the
mandate period, major oil explorations were undertaken after the discovery of huge oil deposits
in Iraq. The Iraqi Petroleum Company, controlled by British, French, American and Dutch
interests, was created in 1925 and had virtual monopoly over all oil production in Iraq.131 In
1932, Iraq gained formal independence from the British Mandate. A period of unrest and
multiple coups occurred between 1932 and 1958. Abdel karim Qasim seized power in the July 14
Revolution of 1958 effectively eliminating the Iraqi monarchy and establishing the Republic of
Iraq.132 Until 1958, the role of the government in agriculture was limited to water control
structure on major rivers. That changed in 1958 when the government became more involved in
the organization of the rural economy and society; and the resources from oil enabled the
government to be a major investor in the provision of water and agricultural services. The role of
the government in water and agricultural services grew in the following decades.133 The
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expansion of oil production and expanding urban centers prompted a wave of migration from
southern Iraq to Baghdad and Basra in the late 1940s to mid 1950s as agriculture and pastoralism
became less viable due to issues of water, and the system of land ownership changed.134

First Wave of Rural-Urban Displacement (1947 to 1956)
A big wave of rural-urban migration from the southern governorates to the big cities like
Baghdad and Basra took place between 1947 to 1956.135 There were about 600,000 to 800,000
Iraqis from southern Iraq who moved to Baghdad and 120,000 to 175,000 migrant communities
in the south who moved to Basra.136 A 1957 study that examines the drivers for migration during
that period revealed that people moved mainly due to issues related to poor water management;
there were massive floods that had swept large areas of southern Iraq causing widespread
damage to crops and property in 1954;137 farmers also faced a lack of water for irrigation
purposes and were confronted with inadequate methods of cultivation.138 As agricultural
productivity declined, people of southern Iraq were forced to move their homes and seek other
occupations in Baghdad and Basra.139 Southern Iraqis were to face yet another wave of forced
environmentally-induced displacement four decades later following the rise of the Ba’athist party
and the presidency of Saddam Hussein. Southern Iraqis were seen as a threat to the state of Iraq
during the Ba’athist regime and faced massive forced displacement.
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Warfare, Water Destruction and Displacement
In the years following the fall of the Iraqi monarchy and the rise of the republic in 1968, Iraq’s
irrigation and hydroponic system was neglected. In the 1970s, the Ba’athist party rose to power,
and Saddam Hussein became the president of Iraq in 1979. The subsequent years in Iraq were
characterized by a complete degradation to the country’s water system as the Ba’athist
government’s aggressive military state proliferated, and its political ideology became a
militaristic one. Two years after the end of the Iraq-Iran war that lasted eight years from 1980 to
1988 the regime of Hussein waged an unsuccessful war on Kuwait in an attempt to annex it. In
response, the US and its coalition forces comprised of 35 nations began Operation Desert Storm,
or the first Gulf War, that expelled Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

The environmental implications of all these wars were disastrous. During the Iraq-Iran war,
Iranian forces bombed a hydroelectric station in Kurdistan.140 Baghdad’s modern water supply
and sanitation system was deliberately destroyed during the first Gulf War as the US and its
allies bombed eight multi-purpose dams and destroyed four out of the seven major pumping
stations as well as roads and infrastructure crucial for farms; 31 municipal water and sewerage
facilities were also bombed resulting in sewage pouring into the Tigris River.141 Iraqis suffered
the consequences.142 Two major events followed the first Gulf War that further impacted Iraq’s
water system and the Iraqi people: the destruction of the Mesopotamian marshes by the Ba’athist
regime in 1990 and the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq in 1991.
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Almost immediately after the Gulf War, the US encouraged a Shi’a uprising in southern Iraq
with the aim of further destabilizing Hussein’s government.143 The US failed to offer military
support to the revolution rendering it ulimately unsuccessful.144 In the aftermath of the shortlived uprising, Hussein undertook an extensive and profound campaign poisoning and draining
90 per cent of the wetlands of southern Iraq, al ahwar or the marshes, to quell opposition to his
government and further consolidate his power.145

The drainage of the marshes involved diverting the water of the Tigris and the Euphrates by
creating a third river that was about 565 km long and two canals south and parallel to it.146 One
of the canals diverted the flow of the Euphrates south below the Hammar Marsh, and the second
canal that originates in the lower Euphrates region collected water from the Gharraf river and
diverted it under the Euphrates, away from the Central marsh and below the Hammar marsh
towards Basra.147 The newly constructed river, the Glory River, diverted water from the Tigris’
southern-flowing tributaries running east and parallel to the Tigris until it reached the Euphrates
and its confluence to the Tigris at Quran point.148 This effectively destroyed an entire ecosystem,
as shown in Map 4, including displacing and killing many of the marsh dwellers in south Iraq.149

143

France, Robert, and Edward L. Ochsenschlager. Wetlands of Mass Destruction: Ancient Presage for Contemporary Ecocide in Southern Iraq. Libri Publishing,
2007.
144
Alwash Azzam, Alwash Suzanne, and Cattarossi Andrea. “Iraq’s Marshlands - Demise and the Impending Rebirth of an Ecosystem.” World Water and
Environmental Resources Congress. 2004. Access at < https://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/40737%282004%291>
145
Ibid
146
Ochsenschlager, Edward. “Iraq’s Marsh Arab in the Garden of Eden.” University of Penn Press, 2004.
147
Curtis J. Richardson, Peter Reiss, Najah A. Hussain, Azzam J. Alwash, Douglas J. Pool. 2005. “The Restoration Potential of the Mesopotamian Marshes of Iraq.”
Science 307, no. 5713 (2005):1307-1311.
148
Alwash Azzam, Alwash Suzanne, and Cattarossi Andrea. “Iraq’s Marshlands - Demise and the Impending Rebirth of an Ecosystem.” World Water and
Environmental Resources Congress. 2004. Access at < https://ascelibrary.org/doi/abs/10.1061/40737%282004%291>
149
Alwash Azzam, Alwash Suzanne, and Cattarossi Andrea. “Iraq’s Marshlands - Demise and the Impending Rebirth of an Ecosystem.” Critical Transitions in Water
and Environmental Resources Management, (2004)

44

Map 4 Before and after Maps displaying the Destruction of the Mesopotamian Marshes150

Marsh dwellers occupy the low-lying zone in the south of the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin
that runs across three governorates—Dhi Qarriya, Missan and Basra—covering a total area of
20,000 sq. km of open water that includes both permanent and seasonal marshes.151 There are
three major marshes: Al Hammar, the Central Marsh and the Hewaizah Marsh, all of which were
drained during Saddam Hussein’s drainage campaign of the early 1990s. The Marsh dwellers’
main sources of livelihood, buffalo herding and fishing, were obliterated with the loss of the
ecosystem. As a result, almost all of the Marsh dwellers were forced to leave. The population of
the Marshes was reduced from nearly 500,000 people in the 1950s to as few as 20,000 by
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2003.152 In the aftermath of the 2003 war, Nature Iraq along with the Ministry of Water
Resources and the UNDP implemented a plan to divert the Euphrates water to the marshes.
Three canals were created to divert the water of the Euphrates to the Central and Hammar
marshes effectively restoring 40 to 60 per cent of the marshes.153 Most of the marsh dwellers
have not been able to return to their homeland as both nature and culture have changed in the
intervening period making the old lifestyle impossible.154 In addition to the drainage of the
marsh, Iraqis bore the burden of a brutal UN sanctions between 1991-2003 that severely
impacted its water system and agricultural productivity.

Economic Sanctions of the 1990s
The UN Security Council passed Resolution 687 in 1991 that imposed economic sanctions on
Iraq.155 The sanctions were a reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and to disarm Iraq of weapons
of mass destruction.156 The sanctions banned all trade and financial resources to Iraq, except for
medicine which was highly regulated.157 The sanctions had disastrous consequences on Iraq’s
economy and people.158 In total, UN Sanctions left 500,000 Iraq children dead and around 5,000
others suffering in the aftermath. Some of the impacts is related to the shortage of clean water
due to the deliberate destruction of the water treatment supply system.159 Evidence reveals that
the US Defense Intelligence Agency deliberately intended to destroy Iraq’s water system through

152

“The Iraqi Marshlands: A human and environmental study.” AMAR International Charitable Foundation. 2001. Access at < https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraqimarshlands-human-and-environmental-study>
153
“Conserving and Restoring the Iconic Marshes of Southern Iraq.” Wetlands International. 2016. Access at < https://www.wetlands.org/casestudy/conserving-andrestoring-the-iconic-marshes-of-southern-iraq/>
154
“The Iraqi Marshlands: A human and environmental study.” AMAR International Charitable Foundation. 2001. Access at < https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraqimarshlands-human-and-environmental-study>
155
S/RES/687
156
Ibid.
157
Alnasrawi, Abbas. “Iraq: Economic Sanctions and Consequences, 1990-2000.” Third World Quarterly 22, no. 2(2010): 205-218.
158
Ibid.
159
Nagy, Thomas. “The Secret Behind the Sanctions: How the U.S. Intentionally Destroyed Iraq’s Water Supply.” The Progressive. 2001. Access <
http://progressive.org/ 0801issue/nagy0901.html>

46

the 1990s economic sanctions.160 The primary document, “Iraq Water Treatment
Vulnerabilities”, dated 1991, illustrates how sanctions would deprive Iraq of clean water:
Iraq depends on importing specialized equipment and some chemicals to purify its water supply,
most of which is heavily mineralized and frequently brackish to saline," the document
states…With no domestic sources of both water treatment replacement parts and some essential
chemicals, Iraq will continue attempts to circumvent United Nations Sanctions to import these
vital commodities. Failing to secure supplies will result in a shortage of pure drinking water for
much of the population. This could lead to increased incidences, if not epidemics, of disease.161

The UN sanctions also meant that Iraq could not renew its farming technology. As a result, its
agricultural productivity suffered due to the lack of fertilizers, agricultural equipment and
necessary pesticide. Further, salinity had spread throughout much of Iraq’s southern and central
irrigated fields as the government was not able to maintain the irrigation system.162 Iraq’s
agriculture stagnated beginning in the early 1990s forcing Iraqi farmers to move into nearby
cities for better economic opportunities. 163 Both the Hussein drainage campaign and the UN
sanctions were deliberate actions that were taken to inflict harm on Iraq, with varying degrees of
impact.

Conclusion
This Chapter provided a historical overview of southern Iraq with an emphasis on the internal,
international and transnational actors that have impacted Iraq’s water resources and caused
displacement. The current state of Iraq’s water system and resource scarcity cannot be
understood without a review of how different historical events have impacted the movement of
people in southern Iraq. The next Chapter sheds light on Iraq’s history post-2003 focusing on the
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role of international and transnational actors in Iraq’s water system and the impact these actors
have had on displacement.
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Chapter Three:
Post-2003 Iraq: International and Transnational Impacts on Water Resource
Management and Displacement in Iraq

“The best time to invest is when there is still blood on the ground”
A Delegate at the ‘Rebuilding Iraq 2’ conference in Washington D.C.164
“Like the prisoners in Guantanamo’s love shack, all of Iraq was going to be bought off with
Pringles and pop culture- that, at least, was the Bush administration’s idea of postwar plan.”
Naomi Klein 165

Introduction
As the previous Chapter highlights, national, international and transnational factors have played
a significant role in Iraq’s water sector, with various implications on displacement. This Chapter
draws attention to transnational factors that have impacted Iraq’s water sector post-2003 in the
form of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. A series of aggressive neoliberal reforms were
undertaken by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that administered Iraq between 2003
and 2005. These reforms can be observed in Iraq’s agriculture, water, and energy sectors, among
others; they can be better understood when placed on the spectrum of neoliberal state-building
through international law and global economic forces such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). While literature has been published on Iraq’s agriculture
and energy sector post 2003, 166 the water sector has been largely left out of the analysis even by
critical accounts of the occupation.
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This Chapter draws on Chimni’s argument and maintains that post-2003 reforms have enabled a
greater role for international and transnational actors on Iraq’s water resources by transferring
ownership and control over Iraq’s resources. Chimni argues that international institutions realize
the interest of an emerging transnational capitalist class. He stipulates that international
organizations facilitate “the further liberalization of international and national markets by heavily
promoting free trade and export-processing zones of interest to transnational corporation.”167
International institutions remove local impediments to the process of capital accumulation to the
“disadvantage of subaltern classes in third and first worlds.” 168 This has become evident in
Iraq’s post-conflict neoliberal model of reconstruction.169 A transfer of ownership and control of
water resources from the public sector to private entities opened up management of Iraq’s water
to international and transnational entities, while decreasing the role of local stakeholders and the
national government in water resource management. Iraq’s post-2003 reconstruction model
excluded people and paid little to no attention to people’s needs.170 Privatizing the water sector
did not address the needs of people, further contributing to population displacement which was
already happening for economic and security reasons.

As Iraq becomes more integrated in the global market, the Federal Government of Iraq must
increasingly manage its water policies in such a way as to modernize them and adapt them to the
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whims of transnational market forces.171 This Chapter first describes privatization and the
commodification of water. Then, it addresses the US role in creating an environment in Iraq
whereby the privatization of water resources has not only been encouraged but bequeathed to
Iraq as the only viable post-conflict development option. The Chapter also provides a description
of the implications for displacement and concludes with the current state of water management in
Iraq.

Privatization and Commodification of Water
Privatization has shifted in recent decades towards a more complex and integrated place in the
continuum between wholly public and wholly private relationships.172 McDonald and Ruiters
distinguish water privatization in the 1800s from today by recognizing that contemporary
privatization of water does not involve full transfer of state assets. Rather it focuses on the
transfer of operational and managerial functions from state entities to private companies creating
‘Public-Private Partnerships’ (PPP).173 These partnerships are a form of privatization since there
is a transfer of power and control over assets to a private company with various rules and
regulations guiding the decision and determining how citizens are able to access information.174
This latter definition of privatization is accepted by the World Bank,175 WHO, UNICEF,176
UNDP,177 and other leading agencies in related fields.178 Starr argues that the relationship
between private and public sectors can range from small operations to large multinational
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companies contracted for any duration; there can be joint responsibilities between the state and a
private firm in managing operational functions.179 Similarly, for the purposes of this thesis, I
refer to privatization as a generic expression of a range of private sector involvement in service
delivery of water wherein assets and decision making are relinquished from the state to a private
entity.

Commercialization and commodification are critical pillars in the discussion of privatization of
water in Iraq. Once water is considered a commodity it becomes commercialized and eventually
privatized. The commodification of water is any “act, policy or practice that promotes or treats
water or water services as an article of commerce to be bought, sold or traded through market
transaction.”180 The commercialization of water in Iraq takes the form of corporatization
whereby services are outsourced to corporations to provide a particular service at cost-effective
prices. Corporatization is also a gateway for direct private sector investment, ownership, or
control of water resources, by making public water services more attractive to the private
sector.181

Water Privatization and Displacement
Privatization is linked with displacement because it makes water inaccessible to poor
communities. Privatized water is associated with higher prices due to the profit-making
incentive, prices at times too high for poor communities to afford.182 For example, the
privatization and commercialization of water in South Africa resulted in 2 million displaced
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South African due to failure to pay their water bills.183 Another implication of lack of access to
water can be seen in irrigated agriculture, where privatization can result in increased
unemployment in rural areas—particularly among farmers—and force rural-urban migration.184
Additionally, projects undertaken by the private sector, especially those related to water
management, do not always undergo social and environmental assessments.185 There are many
examples of this, among them are the internationally-funded hydroelectric projects in Jimma,
Ethiopia that were constructed and operated by a private Italian company. The construction
projects led to massive displacement in Jimma.186 In cases of large water infrastructure projects,
building is based on technical calculation related to the generation of energy, and displacement is
considered a marginal cost rather than a social issue.187

Access to water is particularly problematic in post-conflict settings where countries’ water
management and infrastructure have often been destroyed and people are more likely to lack
access to water resources.188 Lack of water resources becomes another driver for displacement as
it interacts with other economic, political and social factors. Post-2003 Iraq witnessed massive
displacement that was a result of security issues, unemployment, and food and water insecurity.

Post-2003 Iraq opened up new opportunities to commodify public goods such as water that had
previously not been fully integrated into the global market economy. The expansion of new
markets through private sector involvement was promoted through a set of new legislations
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international trade agreements, and international institutions that were poised to deepen the
commodification and privatization efforts in Iraq. These changes have impacted the availability
and the quality of water that, when compounded with droughts, security and economic issues,
has led to displacement.

Integrating Iraq into the Global Market Economy
Policies of the Coalition Provisional Authority
The CPA reforms following the 2003 war forced Iraq to enter the global market through
aggressive neoliberal reforms to the advantage of the transnational neoliberal capital class and
the disadvantage of Iraqi people.189 Integrating Iraq into the global market190 required the
replacement of national laws and jurisdictions with uniform global standards to remove the
barriers to capital accumulation at the global level.191 At the start of Iraq’s occupation in 2003,
Paul Bremer was appointed by George W Bush as CPA Administrator—a man with no Arabic or
Kurdish skills or knowledge of the Middle East. Bremer was given the power to create and
implement the CPA’s policies, which assumed legislative and judicial power over Iraq between
2003 and 2005.192 The CPA’s role in promoting “the welfare of the Iraqi people through the
effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards … the creation
of conditions in which the Iraq people can freely determine their political future” was confirmed
by UN Security Council Resolution 1483.193 This Resolution, as Tzouvala argues, has been a
standard practice in territorial administration since 1990, and engaged the international financial
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institutions, most notably the World Bank and the IMF, in the reconstruction of Iraq.194 In fact,
the World Bank established a Directorate in Baghdad to support its “transition to a market
economy”, and claimed that the future of the water sector “requires good governance, marketbased and private sector led growth, and diversification.”195

The CPA divided Iraq into four geographic zones and administered the country for 14 months,
alongside occupying powers that maintained troops on the ground. During these months, Iraq
witnessed an overhaul of its economy; privatization, deregulation and severe cutbacks in the
public sector were the cornerstone of these reforms.196 The CPA introduced flat tax rates to make
Iraq investor-friendly, created an independent Central Bank and shrank the public sector.197
Private investment was entrenched in the Interim Constitution,198 and retained later in the 2005
Constitution, which remains in force.199 Foreign investors had rights equal to Iraqis in the
domestic markets and, according to CPA Order 39, were allowed to take full ownership of Iraqi
assets.200 Furthermore, borders were open and tariffs were abolished; foreign investors were
allowed to take 100 per cent of the profits they made in Iraq out of the country without having to
reinvest them domestically.201 Investors were able to sign a lease and contract for 40 years which
were renewable. Iraqis had virtually no role in the reconstruction of their country or the decisionmaking process over their resources. To maintain strong links with the world economy, many of
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these policies were integrated in the 2005 Constitution and continue to determine the shape of
Iraq’s economy today.202

Privatizing Iraq’s water
In this broad scheme of privatization, water has also become commercialized and privatized,
especially as the privatization of water is significant to international donor agencies and the
marketplace. Prior to the 2003 War, Iraq’s water services were delivered to the population from
the Tigris and Euphrates after purification in water treatment plants by the government. At that
time, 96 per cent of the urban population had access to safe drinking water as did 31 per cent of
the rural population. Sewage and irrigation facilities were fairly developed in the country.203

The US and its allies targeted Iraq’s water facilities during the 2003 War, severely damaging
electrical and water plants, sewage facilities, canals, dams and water desalinization plants.204 The
2003 war also destroyed vital pumping stations that powered the irrigation schemes which on
agriculture depends, particularly in south and central Iraq.205 In 2003, the US Congress
established the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund with 18 billion US dollars used, among
other things, to build over 100 water infrastructure and treatment facilities. These services were
contracted to US-based construction giants such as Bechtel, Fluor, and Suez; replacing all eleven
state-owned companies that previously provided water services.206 In fact, only a month after the
2003 War stared, the US signed a 680 million USD contract with Bechtel to rebuild Iraq’s water
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infrastructure, and rehabilitate the water treatment plants and irrigation structures within six
months207—Bechtel eventually completed less than half of the construction jobs it was obligated
to perform.208 As Bechtel failed, other corporations such as Fluor were contracted later.209 By the
time Bechtel completely withdrew in 2006, the average Iraqi household received less than 2
hours of electricity, 60 per cent of Iraqis did not have safe drinking water, and only 19 per cent
had sewage service.210 Despite the contracts and the plans, the UN reported in 2013 an “alarming
increase in water pollution” with more than a million cases of waterborne illness countrywide.
Iraq’s water infrastructure and irrigation system was largely in disrepair.211 Not only did these
multinational corporations fail to achieve their contractually obligated goals, they severely
impacted the quality of the two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates; at least two thirds of the
sewage produced by Baghdad’s population of 6 million was dumped untreated into the Tigris
and the Euphrates.212 The lack of access to water and failure of the water and irrigation
infrastructure contributed to population displacement, which was already happening for
economic and security reasons as well as slow-onset environmental events.

Iraqi Displacement
Failure of water services was compounded by a severe drought in 2007 that had profound
implications on Iraqis, particularly families in the south. A significant number of families in
southern Iraq that were suffering from lack of access to water were forced to rely on sources
other than the municipal water grid for their water needs; these included privately owned and
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operated water tanks brought in by trucks for people’s daily water needs.213 Those who could not
cope with the water scarcity were forced to move. In 2007, the IOM reported that a decline in
safe drinking water and sustainable water supplies coupled with the 2007 severe drought in
forced 20,000 rural inhabitants to leave their agricultural communities in search of water.214 This
driver of displacement in Iraq was happening in a setting where massive numbers of people were
already leaving their homes, internally and regionally, as a result of the 2003 invasion and
subsequent sectarian conflict. By 2006, 1.5 million Iraqis had been internally displaced and
between 2005 and 2008, as many as 2.5 million people were displaced internally and outside of
Iraq.215 The drivers for displacement were compounded by issues of the damaged infrastructure,
loss of economic opportunities, and pressure of dwindling natural resources. Iraqi forced
displacement was not only a product of insecurity in the country, but it was also a result of not
being able to access basic services, particularly access to water.216

In addition, failure in repairing irrigation networks, water storage facilities and drainage
networks exacerbated an already struggling agriculture industry in Iraq.217 The Department of
Agriculture in Diyala, southern Iraq, announced in 2012 that damming projects, sidelined
agricultural plans, in addition to droughts, had damaged 200,000 acres of agricultural land
causing food insecurity and leading to high levels of rural-urban migration.218 The current state
of water management in Iraq is not the same in the 2000s—there isn’t as much private sector
involvement—but there is a movement towards enabling further privatization.
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Water Management Structure in Iraq
Iraq’s water supply system is managed by the Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) for the bulk
water supply and the Ministry of Construction, Housing, Municipalities and Public Works
(MoCHMPW). The MoWR replaced the Ministry of Irrigation in 2003 and is responsible for
overall water management in Iraq. The MoWR manages surface and groundwater.219 The
responsibilities of the MoWR include water planning, water allocation, construction, operation
and maintenance of facilities for bulk water supply, as well as flood predication and
mitigation.220 The MoWR also operates dams, reservoirs, hydropower stations, irrigation and
drainage pumping stations, barrages and regulators.221 The MoWR is divided into directorates,
offices, and commissions. It also contracted companies to regulate functions and operations. The
MoWR issues an annual directive for water that allocates water to each governorate based on
forecasted future water needs and available water resources.222 MoCHMPW oversees the
planning and development of municipal water and sanitation projects.223

On the local level, each governorate has a Directorate of Water Resources that operates under the
MoWR who is responsible for implementing the annual water plan published by the MoWR. The
Directorate operates irrigation and drainage projects, and dams and regulators within the
governorate borders, distributes water quotas in accordance with the governorate’s agricultural,
drinking and industrial water needs.224 In doing so, the Directorate of Water Resource works
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with the Directorate of Agriculture to determine irrigation needs. The Directorate of
Environment is primarily responsible for conducting research on air and water and pollution, and
weather conditions. It shares its finding with the Directorate of Agriculture and the Directorate of
Water Resources.225 There are currently significant problems between the governorates’
Directorates of Water Resources in respect to water quantity, timing of its release and quality, as
well as coordination issues with Directorate of Agriculture and Directorate of the
Environment.226

A year after the CPA left Iraq in 2005, Iraq’s water was centralized and publically owned,
however, there has been a move in recent years towards privatizing its water.227 There is a
general lack of information on the current state of Iraq’s water management system. Nonetheless,
according to the World Bank, water tariffs in Iraq are very low while operational costs are high.
Domestic water in Iraq is heavily subsidized, with tariff below one US cent/m3. The average
annual revenue per connection is around 9,300 Iraqi Dinar ($6 USD).228 In terms of irrigation,
The MoWR distributes subsidized equipment such as tractors and water saving equipment to
Iraqis.229 Currently, Iraq is moving towards privatization and that is seen in Iraq’s drinking
water. Local private companies such as UB Holding’s Life, Lolav and Lava that operate out of
Erbil, Kurdistan Region of Iraq and international companies such as Nestle provide drinking
water in Iraq. While there is currently no private sector financing of PPPs in the water sector,
Iraq has signed loans with international organizations that are conditioned on building Iraq’s
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PPPs.230 The World Bank recently signed a $210 million loan with Iraq in 2018 to develop its
water and sewage service, in addition to a water supply reconstruction project that was signed
late 2017.231 The objective for all projects is to create a hospitable environment for private sector
engagement through PPPs.232

Conclusion
This Chapter provided an overview of how water in Iraq not only was specifically targeted by the
US and its allies for military purposes up until the 2003 year, but also its revitalization was
relinquished to private corporations that assumed control over Iraq’s water resource management
between 2003-2006. The destruction and failure to repair water resource infrastructure contribute
to displacement, which was already occurring due to security and other economic reasons.
Transnational factors had and will continue to have influence on Iraq’s water resources.
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Chapter Four:
Perceptions of Water Scarcity: Reporting from the Region
“We, like fish, cannot survive without water.”
Iraqi Buffalo Herder and Fisherman233
Introduction
Chapter Four asks how displaced communities and policymakers perceive the causes of water
scarcity in three governorates of southern Iraq. While environmental and development research
in southern Iraq regarding the situation of the marshlands is already well-documented, the
personal experiences of individuals are often not included. Perspectives from individuals
displaced by water scarcity such as the Iraqi buffalo herder and fisherman quoted (see Figure 1)
are not frequently considered in policy documents and scholarly works on southern Iraq. This
Chapter analyzes water scarcity issues and displacement in southern Iraq from the perspective of
those who live in the region. It examines how internal, international and transnational factors that
contribute to water scarcity and displacement are understood by policymakers, displaced
communities and civil society groups in southern Iraq.
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Figure 1 A buffalo herder and fisherman in Hewaizah Marsh, Missan Governorate. Tiba Fatli, Missan, Iraq, December 7, 2018.

Fieldwork data for this Chapter is based on semi-structured interviews with individuals that took
place in three governorates in southern Iraq: Al Qadyysiah , D and Missan (fieldwork
information is the annex). These governorates are situated at the ends of the two main rivers, the
Euphrates and the Tigris, and are the most severely impacted by water scarcity.234 Interviews
were conducted with members of civil society, displaced populations and communities
threatened by displacement, and directors in the Directorates of Environment, Agriculture, and
Water Resources. Interviews were collected with communities residing, at the time of the
interview, near water sources (see Maps 5 and 6). I argue that to better understand the
complexities of environmental change and displacement in southern Iraq, scholars and
policymakers need to take into account the perceptions of those most impacted by water scarcity.
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This Chapter begins with a description of the governorates and the communities in which the
fieldwork took place. Discussions on the data and documentation of the experiences gathered
from interviews follows. Analysis of the data and conclusions are provided in Chapter Five.
Fieldwork Limitations
There are three main limitations to the fieldwork. One of the major limitations is the gender
balance in interviews, which were mainly conducted with older men. My points of contact in the
remote regions of Southern Iraq are all Iraqi males, who are all also active NGO workers in their
respective governorates. The majority of the participants in the interviews were men unless
female family members had accompanied them. While I did not ask females about their refusal
to be interviewed, I speculate that the reasons for their decline to be interviewed is centered
around cultural concerns and the fact that my community outreach coordinator were male. The
few female participants I encountered were reluctant to speak of their perceptions about water
scarcity and experiences of displacement, and often refused to participate. This is despite the fact
that women take equal responsibility in economic activities, such as herding, milking, and
fishing in addition to household chores like dish washing and cleaning. Their opinions and
agency are not widely recognized by men, and even women counterparts. Thus, my fieldwork
data over-represents men’s perceptions.
The second limitation concerns potential interviewees who were invited by the facilitator to
participate in the research. One or more factors may have skewed their responses: for example,
their fear of retribution from tribal members or leaders, the desire for assistance, or being
influenced by the facilitators’ opinion. This was especially true in the Al Qadyysiah governorate
due to tribal and land conflicts, most recently exacerbated by water scarcity. It was also
64

anticipated that participants might exaggerate their vulnerabilities and diminish their agency and
opinions.

The last limitation is about logistical and security concerns. I was unable to observe or conduct
interviews in other communities that were also facing severe depletion in water resources such as
those bordering Iran due to security issues and limited fieldwork time. Finally, due to the short
duration of the fieldwork there was no time to revisit fieldwork sites and continue to build trust
with respondents over time and gather additional data in confidence. While the validity of the
data is thus skewed, my data nevertheless covers important areas that face severe water
depletion, and information was confirmed with multiple sources to validate fieldwork data such
as drought years, and other environmental and political events specific to southern Iraq.
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Map 8 Fieldwork sites: Each of the pins represent the general locations for the Directorate of
Agriculture, Directorate of Water Resources, and Directorate of Environment for each
governorate.235
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Map 9 Fieldwork sites: each of the pins represents a location of fieldwork site with community
members
Governorate Profiles
The three governorates visited were Dhi Qar, Al Qadyysiah , and Missan .
Dhi Qar Governorate
The governorate of Dhi Qar is located in the southeastern part of Iraq and shares internal borders
with the governorate of Basra, Missan , Al Qadyysiah and Muthana. The governorate’s main
water source is the Euphrates, which crosses the governorate and feeds into the Hammar marsh
and Central marshes that cover one fifth of Dhi Qar’s total area.236 The governorate has a dry
desert climate that is typical of the region, with hot and dry summers and mild winters. Rainfall
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is limited to the months of November to April and averages 100 mm per year.237 Dhi Qar is
divided into five districts: Al Chibayish, Nassirya, Al Rifa’I, Al Shatra and Suq Al Shuyukh,
with 1,742,852 inhabitants, the majority of whom are Shi’a Arabs, with low numbers of Sunni
Arabs, Assyrian and Chaleadan Christians, and Mandeans.238
Dhi Qarriya’s marshes are home to the Marsh dwellers, many of whom have been displaced
since 1991,239 are currently in the process of being displaced, or under threat of displacement due
to water scarcity and drought. Most of those who were internally displaced in the 1990s went
upstream the Tigris River either to the Hewaizah marsh in the Missan governorate as it was not
as impacted by Saddam Hussein’s drainage campaign like the other two marshlands, or to Tikrit
northwest of Baghdad. Between 2003 and 2005 most of those marsh dwellers displaced from Dhi
Qar during the 1990s returned to Central and Hammar marshes when 50 per cent of the marshes
were re-flooded. 240 In spite of the re-flooding, in the last decade and a half, the restored area has
shrunk drastically. There were four particularly bad drought years that have resulted in the
shrinking of the area: 2003, 2005, 2015, and 2017, the latter during the time of this fieldwork.241
As a result of the dwindling wetlands, marsh dwellers have been moving back and forth between
locations in Missan and northwest Baghdad. The areas that were especially affected by the
marshes’ droughts and forced displacement are Chibayish, Fhood, Hammar, Islah, Souq AlShuyoukh, Tar, Akika, Garmat Bani Saiid, and Said Dikhil.
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Missan Governorate
The second location for the fieldwork was Missan , alternatively named Missan. The governorate
is located in southern Iraq on the border with Iran. Its geographical landscape is dominated by
the Hewaizah marsh fed by the Tigris River. The marsh is transboundary, shared with Iran, and
receives 40 to 50 per cent of its water from the Karkhah River on the Iranian side of the marsh
and the rest from the Al Musharah and Al Kahla rivers on the Iraqi side. On the Iranian side, the
marsh is known as the Haur Al Azim. Missan ’s climate and demographic is similar to that of
Dhi Qar’s, but it has a smaller population of 922,072 million inhabitants. Missan is comprised of
six districts: Ali Al Gharbi, Al Mejar Al Kabir, Al Maimouna, Al Kahla Ammarah and AL At
Saleh.242
According to the accounts of people from Missan during the fieldwork, Missan’s infrastructure
was severely impacted by the wars and drainage campaign of the 1980s and the 1990s.243 This
inhibited and continues to constrain the national government’s ability to distribute water through
its canals. The Hewaizah marsh did not experience the same levels of drainage and has remained
ecologically more intact than the Hammar and Central marshes because of the input of water
from the Karkhah river on the Iranian side.244 Thus, while some marsh dwellers migrated to Iran
for refuge, others stayed and were joined by marsh dwellers from the other two marshes that
were completely dry. Although Hewaizah remained more ecologically intact from the drainage
campaigns than in other areas, current residents are facing severe water scarcity. Today, marsh
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dwellers from the other two marshes and traditional residents of Hewaizah are forced to survive
on shrinking water (see Figures 2 and 3).245 As a result of this water scarcity throughout Missan,
people move to urban areas internally, as well as to Iran.

Figure 2 and 3 Hewaizah water level: a Hewaizah resident uses a stick to demonstrate the low water level in the marsh the civil
society members observe the shallow marsh. Tiba Fatli, Missan, Iraq, December 29, 2018.

Al Qadyysiah Governorate
The third fieldwork site was Al Qadyysiah governorate situated in southcentral Iraq. It is
considered one of the most fertile areas of the country and enjoys a high level of agricultural
activities. The main crops cultivated historically in the governorate are rice, wheat, and barley.
As a result of water shortages, however, many rice and barley fields are being replaced with
vegetables such as tomatoes and lettuce that consume less water. The Euphrates River and one of
its major tributaries, the Shamiya River, both run through the governorate. Its climate and
demographics resemble that of Dhi Qar and Missan, with 1,076,658 inhabitants.246 The Al
Qadyysiah governorate is composed of four districts: Al Qadyysiah , Afaq, Al Shamiya and Al
Hamza.
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Environmentally-Induced Displacement in Southern Iraq
As crops fail and buffalo die, both herders and farmers leave the marshes and rural areas for
urban locations. Traditionally, some marsh dwellers with more nomadic lifestyles relied on
buffalo herding and fishing to meet their needs while sedentary farmers grew wheat and barley.
Internal migration has long characterized the lives of marsh dwellers. While buffalo herders on
the marshes have always moved within the marshes, the communities viewed the movement as
seasonal and not “forced.” In the winters, herders move downstream to avoid cold and deep
levels of water; in the dry summers, dwellers return upstream.247 Beginning in 1991, however,
communities began to describe their movements as displacement, and today this word remains in
their vocabulary because they are being forced to abandon southern Iraq, the marshes, and, for
some, even the country; not out of choice but out of necessity.

Generally, there are two kinds of environmentally-induced displacement that is occurring in
southern Iraq linked to water. One is buffalo herders who stay close to the marshes and move
upstream along the two rivers; and the other is displaced farmers whose land is no longer arable,
or has been sold to private or public contractors. The lands are then mainly used for real-state
and private investment.248 As a result of resource scarcity, people in southern Iraq abandon their
land or sell it to private or public investors and move to urban areas such as Baghdad.

While these categorizations do broadly apply, they do not describe all experiences. In some
cases, decreasing water availability and increasing droughts cause the traditional distinctions
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between farmers and herders to be blurred as people in southern Iraq diversify their means of
livelihood production. Farmers start to herd, and herders start to farm. Yet for many families, this
only prolongs an eventual displacement. This is the case for the family pictured in Figure 4 Their
animals died and their farms failed. In the pictures below they are packing and moving to an
urban setting nearby.

Figure 4 A Family in Missan migrating to a nearby village. Photo taken during the fieldwork. Tiba Fatli, Missan, Iraq,
December 10, 2018.
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Perceptions of Water Scarcity
“We just want a fair distribution of water. We need fairness”
Iraqi Farmer249
“We view water scarcity in relation to our lives and environments. Water is part of our lives and
cannot be removed.”
Iraqi Marsh Dweller250
This section highlights the perceptions of policymakers, civil society members, and those
impacted by displacement about the reasons why southern Iraq is facing water scarcity.
Discussions focused on international, national, and transnational factors. While community
members and government officials generally agree on the definition of water scarcity and the
drastic decline in the levels of water resources of southern Iraq in recent years, perceptions of the
causes and proposed solutions differ. As a result of differences in problem definition, officials
and community members propose different solutions. Government officials frequently highlight
increasingly efficient allocation systems as possible solutions to the water crisis while
community members do not see that solution as being sufficient to address changes in the
climate.
International Factors
Climate Change
International factors were heavily stressed by different groups of marsh dwellers and farmers.
Their main grievances and perception of the catastrophic state of water in their homeland is
closely linked to the lack of rainfall and necessary evaporation, and extreme heat waves. There
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were four years of severe droughts between 2005 and 2017 that were consistently cited
throughout interviews: 2005, 2008, 2015 and 2017. These drought dates were identified by
marsh dwellers during fieldwork and corroborated by data gathered from the Ministry of
Transportation (see Figure 5, 6, 7 and 8).251 For interviewees, these environmental changes
constituted a direct and obvious cause that was often characterized as being “unprecedented” and
“unsolvable.” They had not witnessed such severe droughts with such frequency in their
lifetimes. Buffalo herders and farmers who have resided within southern Iraq their entire lives
understand the changing climatic conditions as a general trend occurring not just within the state
boundaries of Iraq but beyond as well. In short, people who have never left southern Iraq link
changes in their once familiar environment to global climate change. For officials, climate
change was rarely discussed; rather, other international and internal factors were perceived as the
causes for the scarcity such as governance, corruption, the politics of Turkey and Iran, and
irrigation methods.
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Figure 5, 6, and 7 Average Annual Rainfall in Fieldwork Governorates as recorded by the Meteorology and Seismic Monitoring
Center Iraq’s Ministry of Transportation
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Figure 8 Maximum Temperature for the month of July (Celsius) in Dhi Qar, Southern Iraq as recorded by the Meteorology and
Seismic Monitoring Center Iraq’s Ministry of Transportation

Community members appear to anticipate that this severe change in weather patterns is not only
unprecedented but also irreversible. They perceive severe heatwaves and the uncertainty in
rainfall as the major threats to their livelihoods. Marsh dwellers who were displaced in the 1990s
indicated that their current forced movements are more threatening to them than the previous one
because the frequency of the reduction in water levels and the severity is related to weather
conditions that might not change as opposed to internal politics that can be changed. Hussien’s
diversion of water sources in the 1990s can be un-done, as was the case in 2004 when the
marshes were restored. Yet heatwaves and rainfall cannot be fixed by the national government.
Similarly, farmers who are being threatened with displacement or who have already been
displaced indicate that their relationship with their land has changed due to what they perceived
to be “irreversible climate change.” One displaced farmer informed me of his realization: “When
I moved to Baghdad in the 1990s, I knew I would be back, so I did not sell my land. Last year, I
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had to sell 20 dunums252 of my land because I have not been able to cultivate it since 2008.”
Most farmers in Al Qadyysiah and Missan report similar stories.

Community members link climate change with supernatural forces or/and pollution from
industries, especially oil factories in the south:
“It’s in Allah’s hand.”
“We don’t know why. It is up to Allah.”
“We see factories drill and water turns dirty afterwards. There has to be a connection.”
The few women I was able to speak with during the fieldwork in Missan also expressed health
concerns about using the Tigris water for bathing and doing household chores. They directly link
it to fracking (see Map 7 for petroleum and gas infrastructure locations).
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Map 10 Iraq Petroleum and Gas Infrastructure 253

Dam Building
Another international factor cited among community members across the governorates is dam
building outside of Iraq’s borders. This factor is perceived to be related to Turkey’s and Iran’s
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control of the upstream water flow of water resources into Iraq. While officials downplayed
climate change, they frequently discussed international factors in light of aggressive Turkish and
Iranian policies. Iraqi officials believe that Turkey is managing water resources in order to
pressure Iraq into expanding its investments throughout the country for example, by increasing
Turkish investment in oil refineries and infrastructure projects inside Iraq. A common narrative
that circulates among officials regarding Turkey’s Illsu dam project is that its main aim is to
submerge areas to oppress dissent in Turkey and pressure Iraq at the same time. This is reflected
in the perception of the “oil for water” scheme as a justification for restricting water flows to
Iraq. The Iraqi officials interviewed believe that it is the absence of international agreements
between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria that water resources are being unequally distributed. In fact,
during two conferences on water scarcity and its solutions on December 17th of 2017 and January
6th of 2018 that I attended, Iraqi politicians pushed for the signing of an international water
agreement between Iran, Iraq and Turkey.254
While some displaced communities reflect the concerns of officials, they perceive the issue as
being interrelated with regional climate change. Common comments among individuals who saw
dam building as a political concern ranged from “well, we heard that Turkey shuts off water;”
“Turkey isn’t giving us our share of water;” to “we hear that water resources were shut off from
the upstream of the Euphrates.” People’s perception of this factor rests on their belief that Turkey
assumes full control over Iraq’s water resources. This issue is compounded by the belief that Iraq
has failed to negotiate a water treaty with Turkey and make the necessary political arrangements
for equal distribution of water. The “Turkish factor” was often reiterated within a political
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context that involved exchanges of oil and water between Iraq and Turkey. A statement that was
often cited by a majority of participants is, “Turkey wants a barrel of Iraq’s oil for a barrel of
water.” While this is what people hear on the television and news outlets, the perceptions of the
political relationships between Turkey and Iraq was one of unequal distribution of transboundary
water resources. In addition to citing Turkey as a factor for water shortages, interviewees in
Missan raised particular issues with Iran’s policies. Iran’s dam project on the Karkhah river has
severely impacted the river’s water level. Iran’s and Turkey’s policies were viewed as unjust and
unfair, and disproportionately impacting Iraq’s southern region. People generally perceive
themselves as having to bear the burden of water scarcity due to Iraq and Turkey’s inability to
reach an agreement.
Members of displaced communities in all governorates conceptualize the construction of large
infrastructure projects within regional climate changes. Dam building was not just political, as
most officials perceive it, but as a necessary measure Turkey and Iran have to undertake to
address extreme heat waves and lack of rainfall within the region. In this context, individuals
expressed frustration with Iraq’s lack of dykes for water storage in the southern parts of the
country. Alternatively, the Director of the Directorate for Water Resources in Dhi Qar traced the
issue to the 1980s and the absence of large infrastructure projects such as dams to store water.
Mr. Hussien Ali Hussien of Dhi Qar’s Directorate of Water Resources stipulated that Iraq,
especially its southern region, is bearing the burden of years of wars and negligence of
development projects. While neighboring countries such as Syria, Iran and Turkey were building
dams and erecting large infrastructure projects, the Ba’athist regime in Iraq “was busy fighting
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neighboring countries.”255 The water sector was further destroyed during the sanctions in the
1990s and the subsequent 2003 War. Canals, dykes and other water distribution infrastructure
measures in southern Iraq have not yet been reconstructed to levels sufficient enough to manage
water in the region. Thus, all groups agreed that there was a lack of infrastructural development
projects necessary to store water and address water scarcity.

Local Factors
Perceptions of Impingement on Water Shares
There were local factors that contributed to water scarcity. The factors were mainly related to
governance and mismanagement of water services. Virtually all southern Iraqis perceived
internal factors of mismanagement of water resources as a cause for dwindling water resources.
Every person that was interviewed—community members, state officials, and civil society
alike—expressed issues with the mismanagement and distribution of water in Iraq, both between
and within the governorates of the country. The exact nature of their issue depended on their
location, geographically—along the course of rivers—and socially. Marsh dwellers and farmers
raised particular issues with not receiving their fair share of water. For them, this violates the
annual water distribution plan that is issued on a yearly basis by the Ministry of Water
Resources. They all contend that each governorate overuses its water quota thereby impinging256
on the water shares allocated for subsequent governorates. Governorates located on the upstream
of the two rivers withhold water and do not release enough of it to their southern governorates,
thus violating the annual directive of the Ministry of Water Resources. For Dhi Qar, its buffalo
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herders have to constantly move upstream and downstream to adjust to the changing levels of
water throughout the year. In a similar vein, upstream farmers and fisherman within and between
governorates overuse their allotted shares of water thereby impacting the levels of water in the
southern parts of the governorates (see Figure 5). One buffalo herder on the Central marsh
explained the issue of unfair distribution of water stating:
The minute the Euphrates enters Iraq, every governorate impinges on its share that violates the
annual plan sets forth by the Ministry of Water Resources, especially during the dry seasons
between April and November. And within the period, farmers along the way also impinges on
their shares by installing additional and unlicensed water pump stations on the river and its
branches leaving the southern region in general and the marshes in particular with the last drop of
the rivers.257

Community groups and individuals that were interviewed as well as advocates and civil society
groups and affiliates acknowledged and sympathized with individuals who impinge on others’
allocated shares since some of these individuals indicated that they were forced to do so because
the annual plan does not meet their water needs to cultivate or herd their animals. In fact, a civil
society activist in Missan governorate highlighted the difference in perceptions of impingement
between officials and community groups: “officials like to heavily draw on the issue of
impingement within governorates, however, less than 5 per cent of the water scarcity issue in the
south is related to this factor.”258 For civil society groups and displaced communities,
impingement, while necessary to address, is a marginal factor in the issue of water scarcity in
comparison to issue of climate change. This may explain why residents of southern Iraq
frequently observe their neighbors taking water with unlicensed pumps but take no action (see
Figure 9). One farmer explained, “if other farmers had enough water, they would not overuse
their shares of water. Their shares are not enough and there is no rain. How is a farmer going to
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farm with no water?” Empty and unmaintained irrigation canals are a common sight throughout
the region (see Figures 10 and 1). Thus, communities acknowledge that internal management of
water resources is an issue. They perceive it as an unintended consequence of climate change and
its impacts on water scarcity.

Figure 9 Impingement: an unlicensed pump taking water from a canal in Al Qadyysiah. Tiba Fatli, Al Qadyysiah,, Iraq,
December 10, 2018.
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Figure 10 and 11 southern Iraq’s water management infrastructures has not fully recovered from the dual threats of war and
climate change. Many canals have been destroyed and the canals that do exist are unmaintained and hold little water. Photos
taken during the fieldwork. Tiba Fatli, Al Qadyysiah, Iraq, December 10, 2018.

Farming Methods
Perceptions of impingement, or as some officials call it, “water theft,” prevailed when marsh
dwellers took issue with farmers in governorates with high levels of agricultural activities,
particularly Al Qadyysiah , Nejaf and Hellah. Marsh dwellers explained that the flood method of
irrigation being utilized by farmers in these governorates is incompatible with the current levels
of water, and is an inefficient technique for irrigation. Marsh dwellers blame farmers for
contributing to water scarcity by continuing to use flood irrigation when more efficient
technologies like drip and spray exist. Farmers are perceived to have a disproportionate share of
the water resources, compared to animal herders and fishermen in the marshes. This is because
around 75 per cent of Iraq’s water is used by the agriculture sector for irrigation and food
production, while 18 per cent is allocated for industrial and municipal usage and marshlands—
divided equally between the two; the rest is allotted to fish farms and livestock.259
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Thus, water distribution is a point of contention between farmers and marsh dwellers. Farmers in
Al Qadyysiah governorate indicated either that they were open to new methods of irrigation but
were not willing to switch the crops they cultivated, or dismissed the option as insufficient for
addressing a severe water crisis that is threatening the country. Farmers who say they are willing
to change irrigation methods but not crops limit the possibilities for water conservation. This is
because many crops irrigated with flood irrigation could be compatible with spray methods but
drip—the most water efficient method—is not easily compatible with field crops like rice and
barely. Civil society groups stressed the issue of insufficient and outdated farming methods and
acknowledged that while the common irrigation methods have been employed since Sumerian
times, it is no longer a practical choice given the current state of water resources. In fact, Nature
Iraq is currently running test trials of drip and spray irrigation techniques to introduce a more
efficient irrigation system. All agreed that irrigation methods were only an issue when there is no
rainfall and farmers irrigate their rice fields consuming large quantities of water when doing so.
Patronage Networks and Perceptions of Farmers
Almost all farmers perceive patronage networks as a reason for the depletion of water resources.
Corruption occurs as a part of these networks and the unfair distribution of water resources is
perceived as severe in agricultural lands. A few of the farmers pointed to fully cultivated lands
owned by tribes with ties to the local government—a rare occurrence since the droughts of 2008.
For example, some residents are able to obtain licenses for multiple water pumps to run water
from local river branches to irrigate their farms, thereby reducing the amount of water available
for neighboring farm lands to the south and downstream of the marshes.
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Another water management issue community members raised is the irregular and inconsistent
water amounts discharged from the gated dams. Discharges of water were viewed as being
unbalanced and not on par with seasonal demands. This is particularly true for farmers who were
not receiving enough during cultivation season and more than they needed during harvesting. For
farmers, issues of water scarcity were contextualized within a larger and more problematic
agenda of “killing the farming industry.” Several farmers contended, “the government’s policy is
killing the farmer.” This translated into their perceptions of the government’s failure to deliver
basic water management services that were received prior to 2003, including cleaning the lakes
and branches of the rivers, providing sewage treatment, and the like. Local governance was
perceived as being negligent in delivering basic water services to farmers. Fair distribution of
water resources appears to be one of the common perception and explanation for the situation of
people in southern Iraq.
Policymakers perceived water scarcity as a political matter and an internal governance failure.
For the majority of the officials that were interviewed, there was no water scarcity. Rather, the
issue was limited to water shortages experienced by southern Iraqi governorates during the dry
season. For them, the largest factor in seasonal water shortage is unequal distribution of water
resources between and within governorates. This is blamed on impingement of governorates and
individuals into others’ shares. Some officials went so far as to call individuals who install
unlicensed water pumps on branches of the rivers as “water thieves.” Every director of the
Directorate of Water Resources, Directorate of Environment, and Directorate of Agriculture, in
all three governorates, articulated their frustration with governorates that borders them in the
north which do not release the annual agreed upon water shares to the neighboring governorate
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to the south. This issue was particularly stressed during interviews with the directors of the
Directorate of Water Resources.
The difference between the perceptions of officials versus community members living on or by
the water became stark when issues of farming and irrigation were discussed. Officials,
particularly those from the Directorate of Agriculture, expressed concern with the “culture of
Iraq’s farming,” as it was termed by the Director of the Directorate of Agriculture in Al
Qadyysiah . He linked the issue of water shortage with the water usage methods irrigating rice
fields. The official deemed Iraqi farmers “lazy…uncivilized and [too] inept to learn new methods
of irrigation.”

While the issue of irrigation was discussed with community members, the perception of the Iraqi
farmer and her/his violation of water shares was perceived differently. While community
members felt compelled to install extra water pumps to irrigate their land due to the regional
water crisis, officials directly linked issues of water scarcity to this practice. In fact, the director
of the Directorate of Water Resources in Al Qadyysiah indicated: “If farmers adhere to the
distribution of water set forth by the annual plan, the water would be enough. The farmers don’t
commit to the water plan.” In light of this issue, officials conveyed frustration with the political
decentralization of Iraq’s government post 2003 and the CPA’s policies. Prior to 2003, directors
of Water Resources Directorates around the country had the power to fine and impose
punishments on those who violated their share of water determined by the Directorate of Water
Resources by installing unlicensed water pumps or running pipes to the rivers without
permission of the Director. However, this privilege was dissolved after 2003. Directors of the
Directorates complained that they are unable to address issues of violations; instead, they have to
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issue a complaint to the local court which takes an average of six months at which time the
farming season passes, the farmer is no longer overusing their allocated share of water and the
complaint is consequently dropped. These changes were perceived as a major barrier in
addressing water scarcity and a direct cause of water scarcity in the south of Iraq.
The decentralization and policy changes post 2003 were also viewed as a reason for the
additional governance issues of mismanagement, miscommunication and lack of cooperation
between ministries. While conducting the interviews, I heard multiple accounts and confusion by
Directorates about the role of the Directorate of Environment particularly, and the Directorate of
Water Resources, generally. In some cases, the Directorate of Environment was perceived as
being a research center, while at other times it was thought of as a Directorate that addresses
environmental issues in the governorate such as air and water pollution.

Transnational Factors
Transnational factors were also mentioned during the interviews with communities, concerned
with oil fracking in the rivers and commodification of water.
Presence of Corporations
Commodification and privatization of water resources in Iraq was only mentioned among
displaced communities. While privatization and investment was not explicitly mentioned during
the interviews with communities, individuals identified trends of growing investment in southern
parts of Iraq, especially in Basra. A group of women in Missan linked the pollution of their
waters to fracking and oil drilling when expressing growing concerns about their families’
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health.260 The interviewees did not explicitly identify the names of companies or actors involved
in drilling, they indicated that they have observed a growing presence of entities involved in
drilling. This, people indicated, is a contributor to the pollution and poor water quality which
forces them to buy water for drinking and other household purposes. Farmers raised particular
concern with the lack of agricultural equipment and the Directorates absence in maintaining and
cleaning irrigation canals. As a result of this perceived state retreat, community members rent
their own equipment to maintain canals and other water management infrastructure. This extra
expense is incurred by farmers and benefits private owners of equipment and fuel. More
importantly among farmers and herders are the government’s welcoming responses to foreign oil
investors in southern Iraq. Farmers in particular claimed that the government continues to
decrease the allocated water for irrigation yearly while increasing oil investment contracts, which
they understand requires water for extraction. Individuals indicated that they understood there is
a severe lack of water and droughts in Iraq which impacts the amount of water allocated to
irrigation, but they did not understand why they see an increasing present of foreign oil
companies that drill in their rivers.

The commodification of water within the last decade and a half was a serious concern for all
participants. Iraqis perceived water as a right that they did not have to pay for, until recently. A
farmer in Al Qadyysiah questioned the lack of drinking water in Iraq and the growing presence
of foreign water bottles. He questioned “Why are we drinking imported water from dry Jordan
when Iraq has far more water resources? They first pollute our rivers, dry them out and sell us
imported water.” The sudden emergence of water bottles since 2003 was perceived as an
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anomaly across all respective governorates, and even among the marsh dwellers who are
considered to be the most isolated group in southern Iraq.261 Community groups did not refer to a
specific entity or person as being responsible for the commodification of drinking water rather
they often used an unidentifiably “they” or “we don’t know.”

From my observations, international and local companies sell bottled water in Iraq such as
Oasis262 Nestle and local private companies such as UB-Holding’s Life, Lolav and Lava water.263
Perceptions among southern Iraqi communities of companies that sell water is similar to what
Linton describes as the process modern abstraction of water.264 People understood the
commodification of water as a process that strips Iraq’s water from its social and environmental
relationship to its people in the south because the commodification of water does not take into
consideration the extent to which people rely on water in terms of farming, fishing herding,
cleaning, eating, drinking, and bathing if they can afford to purchase water.

Lack of Water Services and Poor Quality of Water Resources
The commodification of water addresses the perceptions of people mainly with regard to the
reduction of the quantity of water. An important issue of water governance is not only the
deprivation of quantity, but also of quality. All participants expressed concerns with the quality
of water, and the lack of water facilities to provide drinking water and services to clean the
rivers. In all governorates and all groups, people expressed concerns with the lack of sufficient
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sewage treatment centers and dysfunctionality in the existing ones. Community members
expressed their concerns at the lack of services. Officials viewed this issue as the responsibility
of the central government in Baghdad which is tasked with contracting service providers. Both
the central government and the governorate Directorate of Water Resources failed to provide
services to governorates in southern Iraq. As of 2015, it was reported that Dhi Qar was far below
the 86.6 per cent national average of access to drinking water and only one fifth of the population
relied on the public sewage system as the primary method of disposing of waste water.265
Similarly, Missan and Al Qadyysiah are below the national average and only 60 per cent and 15
per cent, respectively, are connected to sewage network systems.266
ISIS
In addition to the international and internal factors that are perceived to cause the scarcity of
water, the occupation of Mosul and western parts of Iraq by ISIS was briefly mentioned by a few
officials and community members. The impact of ISIS on Iraq’s water issues was not reflected
during the fieldwork. However, there is plenty of literature on the implications of ISIS when
analyzing the issue of water scarcity in Iraq post-2014.267 Few explicitly acknowledged that
ISIS’ control of upstream water resources and the Mosul Dam caused severe drought in the
southern Iraqi governorates in 2015. Individuals indicated that within the overall issue of
droughts and scarcity that they often traced to 2008, the lack of rainfall and climate issues were a
bigger concern and a larger contributor to the shortage of water resources than ISIS.
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Generally speaking, ISIS’ control of the Mosul and Haditha dams were discussed more with
officials than community members. The control of ISIS over water facilities and infrastructure
was perceived as a reason for issues of reductions in water quality and quantity. More
importantly, however, is the reallocation of government funds towards the Ministry of Defense
to fight ISIS. This was perceived to have diverted funding away from other Ministries, such as
the Ministry of Water Resources, and then paralyzing their work.
Conclusion
This Chapter presented the perceptions of people in southern Iraq on water scarcity and its
causes. The Chapter outlined the perceptions based on how they were described to the author
during the fieldwork in south Iraq. Overall, climate change appears to be more visible for
community members and internal factors of governance were mostly discussed among officials.
Communities stressed issues of commodification of water, internal mismanagement of water
shares and dwindling quality of water resources.
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Chapter Five:
Production of Water Scarcity: Perceptions and Reality
“Water is not about water. Water is about building people’s institutions and power to take
control over decisions.”
Sunita Narain 268

Introduction
Chapter Five analyzes the relevant internal, external, and transnational factors that affect Iraq’s
water scarcity and contribute to population displacement. It considers the extent to which
policymakers and displaced populations understand these factors. It also looks at the implication
of differences between perceptions and reality. Section One assesses data on water scarcity in
southern Iraq. Section Two analyzes the difference of opinion between the published data
provided and the perceptions of policymakers and affected communities. Section Three delves
into the implication of these differences. I argue that water scarcity is a product of the
interactions of internal, international and transnational factors, and that perceptions of water
scarcity are produced through specific relations and modes of knowledge influenced by
international, national and transnational factors. My analysis relies on Linton’s concept of
“hydroelectics”,269 and Chimni’s critique of international institutions and the emerging nascent
global state.270
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Factors Affecting Iraq’s Water Resources
There are a number of factors that impact the quantity and quality of water resources in Iraq.
These include, climate change, regional development projects, and internal governance issues.

International and Regional Factors
As outlined in the introduction of this thesis, water resources in Iraq are threatened by
anthropogenic climate change, which disproportionately impacts regions in the global South.271
While the dearth of data makes climate change analysis difficult in the MENA region, there are
several studies that do observe a regional change in the frequency and severity of heatwaves,
precipitation levels, and lengthening of dry seasons.272 Studies indicate that heatwaves are
increasing by at least an average of .0036 C per year, 273 while precipitation is decreasing in the
region of Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and the Caucasus (see Figure 1).274
The abrupt and severe weather variation in Iraq, as many affected communities explain, is the
result of a regional change in climate. Southern Iraqis’ perceptions of climate change,
particularly the farmers’ and marsh dwellers’ opinions concerning the drastic and unprecedented
heatwaves experienced in Iraq’s southern regions, are consistent with what the published data
reveals.
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Communities’ perceptions on the link between Iraq’s climatic situation and neighboring
countries is reflected in the data. They perceive Iraq’s vulnerability to extreme weather
conditions as part of a broader regional change in climatic conditions. Southern Iraq experienced
its hottest summers and the worst droughts in the years 2007, 2008-2009, 2014-2015, and
2017.275 Affected communities have also expressed concern regarding the general lack of rainfall
and the change in the length of the dry seasons throughout the past decade. Farmers and animal
herders argue that it has impacted irrigation seasons, led to an abandonment of farm lands, and
killed animals in the region. Beginning in 2008, Iraq indeed experienced significant increases in
the length of the dry seasons, substantially decreasing the period of time during which the
rangelands are grazable. Farmers have coped by increasing importation of water and feedstuffs
and a decreasing of the herd sizes. 276 In 2012, the Government of Iraq reported that of the
country 28 per cent arable land, 100,000 dunums was lost each year to degradation. Meanwhile,
39 per cent of Iraq’s surface was estimated to have been affected by desertification, with an
additional 54 per cent under threat.277 IOM found that in 2012, 40 per cent of Iraq’s total
cropland had suffered a significant reduction in productivity and livestock was devastated.278
These weather events are linked to climate change.

As outlined in Chapter One, the link between climate change and displacement is categorized
into sudden-climate events and slow-onset weather events. Southern Iraq is facing the latter.
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Slow-onset events mentioned above such as desertification, land degradation, and drought are
decreasing the size of arable land and herd size in southern Iraq, and slowly making parts of the
region inhabitable and difficult for farmers and herders to sustain their traditional livelihoods.
These weather events form “push” factors for farmers and animal herders in southern Iraq to
migrate, largely within the country. As frequent droughts hit farmlands, Iraqi farmers are forced
to leave their farms to find livelihoods elsewhere, in urban centers closest to their place of origin.
Buffalo herders are also forced to relocate279 As Mayer claims, “no disaster is ever entirely
natural”,280 and climate change does not alone produce water scarcity; it also interacts with
political and internal factors that continue to exacerbate the water crisis in the south of Iraq and
push people to move.
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Figure 8 Time evolution temperature calculated for the MENA region281
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In addition to climate change, water scarcity is further impacted by reduction in the flow of the
two main rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, fueled by regional development projects. This
factor is perceived to be a cause for scarcity mainly among policymakers. A year following the
drought of 2008, Iraqi members of Parliament claimed that rainfall had not actually fallen below
normal levels in Iraq and that the country’s water shortage was a direct consequence of Turkey’s
national development policies that have taken a drastic shift in the 1980s and onwards.282 The
majority of policymakers interviewed dismissed communities’ perceptions of unprecedented
weather conditions, explaining that Iraq had experienced similar hot years in the 1980s.283
Policymakers’ remarks on Iraq’s weather contradict scientific evidence on climate change
showing that Iraq’s recent rainfall reduction has been abrupt and severe. Many officials in
southern Iraq did agree that the lack of rainfall and heatwaves that have hit Iraq play a role in
water scarcity but view it as a normal climatic cycle of changing weather conditions. For the
policymakers, the most pertinent international and regional factors that impact water flow in Iraq
are the development policies of Turkey and Iran that are perceived to be rooted in political
objectives and not only economic development per se. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey
started building dams along the Tigris and Euphrates to develop its hydropower capacities and
adapt to climate change, consequently reducing water flow to its neighboring country. Iran
implemented similar projects beginning in the 2000s. The narrative that water scarcity is largely
caused by dam building in neighboring countries is regularly proposed by politicians; the only
communities which referenced these policies were ones with televisions, they would reference
that they derive this information from listening to the news and the views of policymakers. And
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even with that perception, communities still considered dam building to be a secondary issue; not
one person among the affected communities, downplayed the severity of climate change.

Southern Iraqis’ perception of the implications of dam construction and the impact it has on
water availability is rooted in reality. The annual discharge of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers
has been in steady decline and the discharge is predicted to be reduced by 9.5 per cent by
2040.284 Specific to the region of southern Iraq, the flow has also been severely impacted by the
extensive dam and hydropower construction in Turkey and Iran. Communities and policymakers
heavily stressed this issue. Upstream dam construction projects have increased since the 1960s,
reducing the flow of the two rivers by approximately 80 per cent.285 In addition to these dam
building projects, this percentage is further impacted by the decline in rainfall and changing
weather conditions.
Iraq and its neighboring countries have a long history of tensions over dam construction. The
politicization of dam construction in Turkey and Syria goes back to 1975 when the Keban Dam
in Turkey and the Tahba Dam in Syria were built. The Keban Dam was solely a hydropower
project and caused no loss of water to the downstream riparian state. This was followed by the
construction of the Karakaya Dam, further downstream from Keban in Turkey in 1967 and the
Ataturk Dam in Turkey in 1980. Initially, the Iraqi government was ambivalent to the Turkish
dam construction, but this changed in the 1990s when the flow of water from the Tigris and
Euphrates impacted Iraq’s water resources. These major dam constructions initiated the
Southeastern Anatolia Project of Turkey (GAP) in 1980 which are believed to be politically
284
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rather than developmentally, motivated.286 Turkey signed an agreement with Iraq in 1984 to
provide a minimum water flow of 500 cubic meters per second in the Euphrates. Conflict became
a possibility in 1990 when Iraq and Syria believed that Turkey deliberately reduced their water
share to fill the reservoir for the Ataturk Dam reducing the water of Syrian and Iraqi water
temporarily by 75 per cent.287

Today, the regional water struggle is once again heating up. The GAP project intends to
construct twenty-two large dams including the Ilisu Dam, and nineteen hydropower plants in the
Euphrates and Tigris River Basin to produce electric power and provide irrigation for 1.7 million
hectares of land.288 Twelve large dams and more than 80 per cent of the Ilisu Dam have already
been completed.289 Civil society groups and policymakers are particularly concerned about the
Ilisu Dam. Its largest hydroelectric power project on the Tigris River is 135 meters high, at 526
meters ground elevation with 10 million cubic meters storage capacity.290 This dam is located 65
kms upstream from the border with Iraq and Syria at the village of Ilisu along the Tigris River. It
has the potential to reduce by 56 per cent the flow of the river’s water into Iraqi territory.291

Over the years, both Iraq and Syria filed many claims against Turkey accusing it of withholding
water and causing water shortages.292 In response to Turkey’s dam building, the Iraqi Parliament
pressed the government to demand greater share of water from Turkey in 2009. The Members of
Parliament voted to compel the Iraqi government to include an article in any agreement signed
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with Turkey or Iran to ensure Iraq gets its fair water share.293 Turkey and Iraq held talks in 1980;
and in 2009, Syria and Iraq held a crisis summit in Ankara, Turkey to discuss the issue of
droughts. No agreement was signed but Iraq, Syria and Turkey signed a Memorandum of
Understanding to strengthen communications within the Tigris-Euphrates Basin.294 In more
recent years, Iraq’s Minister of Water Resources has pushed for diplomatic talks with Turkey on
water sharing problems and has established the Department for Partnership with Civil Society
and Communities to engage civil society groups in these efforts.295 Talks between Turkey and
Iraq are ongoing and Iraq is pushing to sign a bilateral agreement on water shares in the Tigris
and Euphrates River Basin.296 In addition to Turkey, Iraq is also negotiating talks with Iran on
issues of water shares concerning the Hewaizah Marsh.297
Iran dam construction on the Kharkha and Karun Rivers has also impeded water flow into Iraq
particularly along the Kharkha River (see Maps 9). 298 These controversial hydropower projects
have raised more concerns among policymakers and civil society groups, sectors which view
dams as a primary threat to Iraq’s water resources. This perception is not shared with affected
communities who, as indicated in Chapter Four, perceive the water scarcity problem as primarily
a climate change issue. The construction of the dams on the Iranian side is mainly problematic
for the buffalo herders and farmers in Missan governorate. The marsh dwellers in Missan as well
as the farmers who rely on the Hewaizah marsh have been greatly impacted by the construction
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of these dams. In some areas of the Hewaizah marsh, water levels have dropped as low as 30
cms. As a result, those in Missan who are no longer able to fish, herd animals, or farm are forced
to move upstream for water or migrate to Iran.299

Map 8 Dams on the Tigris and Euphrates River Basin. 300
Hydropower development projects in Turkey are closely linked to national, regional and global
development strategies—the same strategies impacting Iraq’s water governance. Turkey’s
hydropower projects on the transboundary rivers of the Tigris and Euphrates are part of Turkey’s
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neoliberal transformation of their national energy sector and water management system. This
process started in the 1980s as part of a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP).301 SAP is an IMF
program that provided conditional loans to Turkey in response to the state’s struggles with debt
payments and inflation during the 1970s. These conditions included radical reforms in the
country’s economy to create a hospitable environment for private investors, mainly Western
corporations.302 This program is still in place. Thus, it is not only the Turkish government that is
involved in water resource management. Transnational and international actors are also involved
in Turkey’s national policies. The main financial contributions to Turkey’s hydropower projects
came after Turkey signed the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in
2004 and ratified the 2009 Kyoto Protocol, without any strict reduction targets in Turkey’s
carbon emissions.303 In 2010, Turkey became one of the founding members of the World Bank
partnership for Market Readiness Program and soon received a loan from the World Bank to
“help increase privately owned and operated energy production within the market-based
framework of the Turkish Electricity Market Law.”304 As Islar argues, “Turkey’s climate change
mitigation and hydropower development constitutes a new phase of neoliberal mission in the
Turkish water governance whereby increasing coalitions between Turkey and the World Bank
are emerging as well as new investments between European and Turkish companies.” 305 The
involvement of Western transnational companies in Turkey implies an opaque and diffused form
of governance with significant political consequences internally and regionally. 306 The
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involvement of transnational actors in hydropower projects and water management in Turkey
complicates the management of transboundary waters, and thus impacts the flow of the two
rivers into neighboring counties. It is important to note that while the World Bank is formulating
plans to address water scarcity in Iraq, they are also supporting and engaging in the planning and
implementation of hydropower projects in Turkey that are contributing to water scarcity in Iraq.

Development projects are what scholars consider “non-climatic” factors that exacerbate existing
climatic conditions and induce displacement.307 GAP projects in Turkey and dams in Iran
interact with the increasingly hot weather in Iraq and the decline in rainfall further altering the
flows of the Tigris and Euphrates and their freshwater ecosystems by controlling and diverting
water, thereby impacting the amount of water available for downstream populations in southern
Iraq. Buffalo herders on the marshes in Dhi Qar and Missan and farmers in Al Qadyysiah,
Missan and Dhi Qar are severely impacted by the reduction of water levels, especially because
they are situated on the very ends of the Euphrates. However, as Oli argues, migration is not the
first response to climate change.308 The decline in water resources in southern Iraq does not
immediately induce displacement. Before a “tipping point” is reached and people decide to move
as a result of water scarcity, there are other non-climatic factors that interact with and worsen
existing problems of water scarcity before people decide to move. An illustrative example of a
non-climatic factor is people’s adaptive capacity and vulnerability to changing rivers flows (see
Chapter One). Farmers explained that in the past decade, they switched to crops that consume
less water compared with the more commonly cultivated crops, barley and wheat. At the same
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time, farmers further indicated that they have been increasingly cultivating less dunums of land
each season. In similar ways, buffalo herders choose to pursue other means of adaption such as
selling livestock to meet their immediate needs. In many cases, farmers and buffalo herders do
not find alternative means of adaptation and need to migrate to nearby urban settings. Marsh
dwellers described their movements as being easier than that of the farmers given that all their
houses are easily-assembled reed houses, and their water buffalos can survive as long as there is
water. Farmers’ displacement in Al Qadyysiah, on the other hand, is more permanent and they
are less likely to be able to settle in places where they can practice their farming skills.

Pollution of Water Resources in Iraq
Water quality is rarely regarded as an important factor in water scarcity assessment.309
Nonetheless, water pollution has become a key factor in the exacerbating water problems.310
Water scarcity is further worsened by pollution ensuing from increased salinity, industrial waste,
large infrastructure dam projects in the region, and lack of water and sewage treatment
facilities.311 The low flow rates have impacted the quality of water in Iraq, as communities
explained, allowing around 150km of salt water from the Arab-Persian Gulf to infiltrate the
rivers.312 Failed water and sewage treatment systems within and outside Iraq have also impacted
the quality of water resources, reducing the amount of potable water especially in southern Iraq.
Of the eighteen governorates of Iraq, only ten have wastewater treatment facilities. Around 86
per cent of the urban population and 62 per cent of the rural population have access to an
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improved water source through Iraq’s water distribution system.313 Most of the affected
communities cite lack of rainfall as the main factor linked to the decline in water quality in the
region of southern Iraq as well as the lack of treatment facilities. On the other hand, officials
indicated that the conventional and “primitive” methods of irrigation largely contribute to poor
water quality because the water table rises through flood irrigation, causing salt to rise into the
topsoil, which is then also drained down the rivers.314 Overall, policymakers attribute the lack of
water treatment centers in their governorates to a lack of funding, especially following 2014
when Iraq’s Federal Government allocated much of its budget to the Ministry of Defense and
drastically reduced its funding.315

While the government of Iraq did raise military expenditure in 2015,316 the lack of water
sanitation facilities pre-dates ISIS’ presence in Iraq.317 Similar to perceptions of other factors, all
groups perceived the decline of water quality to be a contributing factor in producing water
scarcity. Data shows that the pollution in water quality is due to climate change, lack of proper
water facilities, as well as use of drainage water in agricultural irrigation and traditional flood
irrigation techniques that “leads to water logging, rising groundwater and, subsequently, higher
levels of pollution and salinity.”318 As discussed in Chapter Three, transnational and international
factors have played a significant role in destroying Iraq’s water treatment facilities and
contributing to the poor water quality. That is to say, policymakers’ and affected communities’
perceptions about the causes of poor water quality is confirmed by the data.
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Poor water quality threatens the water buffalos of the marsh dwellers. Marsh dwellers indicated
that their decision to move is not only influenced by the quantity of water but the quality as well.
Their lives are attached to their water buffalos—when their buffalos don’t endure contaminated
water, they have to move to areas with less contaminated water. For displaced farmers, the poor
quality of water has a bearing on the quality and quantity of crops cultivated. Their crops are
already threatened with low water quantities for irrigation, but in addition the poor water quality
of available water sources can damage their crops, reduce agricultural productivity and push
them to move.
Factors mentioned above contribute to reducing water levels in southern Iraq. The reduction of
water impacts peoples’ livelihoods and, in cases becoming increasingly common, is forcing
people to relocate. As Chapter Four highlights, the perceptions of water problems between the
displaced population and policymakers are different. The next section provides an analysis of the
difference in perceptions.

Difference in Perceptions
Water scarcity in southern Iraq extends beyond its just being an internal issue of distribution and
access. While the water management and the canal systems do increase tensions and compound
water shortages, the scarcity that farmers and marsh dwellers in southern Iraq experience is a
result of the country’s insufficient water resources. However, defining water scarcity as just a
quantitative measure of water, or diminishing quantities of available water obfuscates the bigger
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picture.319 The issues involving water are realized in a specific social and environmental context.
To understand the different perceptions of water scarcity, this Section compares the perceptions
of affected communities and policymakers, and the different contexts in which perceptions and
narratives are shaped about water scarcity. In each section, I consider international, national and
transnational factors that interact to produce water scarcity. When comparing the perceptions
with available data, two general differences in the perceptions emerge: affected communities
draw more on climate change to explain the causes of water scarcity and policymakers draw
more on local factors, especially the mismanagement of water resources and “inefficient”
farming methods to explain the scarcity.
‘Hydroelectics’ and Perception of Water Scarcity in Southern Iraq
The difference in the perception and narratives between policymakers and communities is linked
to the relationship an individual or a group has with water. Linton coins the term hydroelectics to
describe this notion:
Hydroelectics conceives of a water process out of which particular instances of water get fixed, or
instantiated, in social relations. Hydroelectics thus complicates the science of abstract water with
the idea that we cannot have knowledge of water except in relation to our own circumstance and
modes of knowing…knowing and identifying water is necessarily a product of engagement, with
engagement itself being the real-that is, relational, substance of both the knower and the known.320

As such, Linton proposes that water problems such as scarcity are never just water problems but
are a process formed in social and environmental relations. Water and society are not separate.
The concept of water is produced through its cultural and environmental context; how societies
use it, how it feeds into the society, and how it functions within a specific ecological system. I
would also add that not only are problems formed solely in social relations, but in economic and
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political relations as well. Through this lens, the narrative of scarcity southern in Iraqi
communities is shaped by their engagement and relationship with water as a natural resource—
given by God—which is influenced by natural and climatic occurrences. Their observation of
climate change on national and regional levels and the depleting and worsening conditions of the
river waters’ quality is produced by their interaction with water on a daily basis. Communities
understand water as it impacts their social context such as herding, fishing, farming and
environmental surrounding. They can directly, on a daily basis, observe the changes in their
ecological conditions. As such, water problems are perceived within the context of how it alters
and impacts their socio-environmental context.
The major difference in the perceptions of policymakers compared with data on water scarcity is
the emphasis on national and local actors, and the dismissal of international and transnational,
factors, unless it relates to political concerns with Turkey and Iran. While the data reveals that
water shortages in Iraq in recent years is a result of abrupt and severe climatic events fueled by
national development projects in neighboring countries, policymakers emphasized issues of
“good governance,” “irrigation methods,” and “water mismanagement” to frame the water crisis
in Iraq’s southern region. Within this context, the “hydro-social” relations321 with water and the
modes of knowledge that shape policymakers’ perceptions of water scarcity reflect the “hydrosocial” relations and the knowledge of water in international institutions. A narrative that, Linton
reminds us, abstracts water from its socio-environmental context reducing it to western concepts
of quantity and efficiency that is “deliberately non-social and non-historical in a way that the
waters of other places and times are not.”322 As a result, water problems are perceived only as a
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result of reduction in quantities and efficiency in its utilization. Once the perception of water and
its scarcity are abstracted from its social context, the solutions to addressing scarcity also extracts
social implications of water governance. For example, manipulating water in damming it,
diverting it, or creating large infrastructure becomes easier and the human cost, such as
displacement, is downplayed.

The perception of water scarcity and its causes, especially among the policy makers, has been
largely re-shaped by a neoliberal agenda formulated and bequeathed to Iraqis by international
and transnational factors.323 These factors drives perception and policy at the local and state
levels.324 As Chapter Three describes, the CPA implemented aggressive neoliberal reforms in
2003, which were reflected and enforced by international organizations such as World Bank and
the IMF. The Iraqi state’s discourse on water scarcity reflects INGOs perceptions. This is the
context in which, as “hydroelectics” conceives, water scarcity is produced among policymakers.
Policymakers serve to bolster the agenda of international institutions and corporations . Linton
argues that once water and its problems are viewed as issues of quantity and efficiency only, not
considering the social and environmental context, hegemonic powers such as the state or
transnational corporations can manipulate water without seriously considering the social costs
like displacement. And so, the western modern way of viewing water has a political agenda and
its serves to bolster agendas of powerful institutions like the state and corporations. In similar
sense, In similar sense, Chimni also argues that in the name of western concepts of efficiency,
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good governance, modernization and technological advancement, the agenda of transnational
capital is advanced.
Principles of “good governance,” “management,” “efficiency,” “suitability,” and “cultural
change” are the tenets of economic development for these institutions and the pillars for
development in Iraq. 325 In 2004, the World Bank development priorities for Iraq’s post-conflict
reconstruction was, among other things, “good government.”326 Similarly, UNEP’s development
plan for Iraq in 2004, 2007 327 and 2012328 prioritize “good governance,” “sustainability” and the
“rule of law” as related to the issue of water. These assertions are reflected in the 2005 to 2007
national development strategy of Iraq: “the first national development strategy produced by a
democratically-elected government of Iraq.”329 In its vision, Iraq emphasized “good
governance,” “eliminating subsidies that discourage farming,” and finding innovative methods
with the assistance of international donors and partners in “new irrigation methods that
strengthen market mechanisms.”330 It further indicated that “inappropriate water management
practices” must change and Iraq needs to “desperately change its irrigation schemes,”
“rehabilitate its land and water resources” and “introduce more salt-tolerant crops from
international breeding programs and gene banks.”331 Recent national development plans,
especially those addressing post-ISIS reconstruction replicate these perspectives.332 These
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approaches are embraced by local officials in southern Iraq and are used to explain Iraq’s
ongoing water crisis. While “good governance,” “rule of law,” and “sustainability” are of course
useful in water management, they are bequeathed by international institutions to further a
neoliberal agenda of development. According to Chimni, the central motivation for “good
governance,” and the “rule of law” is “to “create conditions that facilitate the operation of
transnational capital.”333 The context in which water scarcity is produced places a heavy weight
on local factors such as farming methods and cultural components but obfuscates international,
transnational, and national actors’ impact on Iraq’s water. As a result, the voices of local
communities are marginalized, furthering displacement.

Implications of the Difference Between Perceptions and Reality
The international, national and transnational factors that cause population displacement in Iraq as
a result of water scarcity are influenced by a complex network of social, economic and political
forces. One of the implications of localizing the problems, i.e. irrigation methods, while
internationalizing the solutions leads to the addressing of the issue through a narrow and even
damaging development model of Iraq that further abstracts water from its social and
environmental context in Iraq. By linking water scarcity to notions of “inefficiency” and
“primitive culture,” Iraq’s development model and ways of addressing its environmental issues
operates under the assumption that it has to fit “along a linear history where the third world is the
primitive past and the western world is the progressive future.”334 Thus, addressing the issue of
water scarcity on a national level in Iraq becomes limited to Western concepts of progress. In
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this manner, Iraq is rendered a “primitive” but “transformable” state with the capacity to
transition to a modern first-world-like culture through the intervention of the global North. It is
also worth mentioning that such discourses of development ignore the fact that water, as Chapter
Two and Three show, was managed more fairly than today in terms of quality and quantity in
ancient Mesopotamia and even in pre-2003 Iraq than it is today. However, former methods of
managing water are not discussed in current and future water management plans.335 Officials in
southern Iraq, and nationally, cannot conceive of a development plan which addresses water
scarcity without following the Western concept of modernization and technological
advancement.336 At a recent conference attended by the MoWR, Government Works and civil
society groups to address water scarcity in southern Iraq, the majority of the time and scheduled
panels were dedicated to addressing how to make Iraq more technologically advanced to “control
water shares,” “prevent impingement of governorates and people” and improve the efficiency of
dams and dykes to measure precisely the amount of water shares in each governorate.337 As such,
local issues are given to international institutions. With increased engagement of international
institutions in addressing water issues in Iraq, the role of transnational actors grows bigger
through private investor contracts. As Chapter Three shows, this has been happening since 2003
and is part and parcel of Iraq’s current model of development.338 Iraq is currently studying offers
from three foreign companies on a strategic 30-year plan for managing its water resources during
this lingering and damaging drought.339 This reflects notions expressed earlier of the need to
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engage international institutions and transnational entities to help Iraq overcome its water crisis
and guide it in the path of Western-driven development.
Marginalizing Displaced Population
In addition to narrow perceptions on how to address water scarcity in southern Iraq, the danger
of viewing water scarcity as an issue linked to the country’s “primitive” and “under-developed”
nature oppresses the voices of affected communities while promoting the voice of the global
North, particularly corporate actors. As stated above, these vocabularies of development reflect
the narrative of international institutions. Conceptions of water scarcity as a matter of “water
management,” whether internationally, regionally or internally where some operation on water
by engineering new supplies or allocating available supplies more efficiently can solve the issue
is problematic. Framing the issue as mainly a water management problem dismisses the
international and transnational factors that contribute to the crisis. As the Indian socioenvironmental activist Sunita Narain asserts, “water is not about water. Water is about building
people’s institutions and power to take control over decisions.” “Taking control over decisions”
is relevant to the water crisis in southern Iraq. Discourses on the causes of water scarcity are thus
shaped for the purpose of assuming control over decisions on water management and
resources.340 The technologies, as well as the construction, operation, and maintenance of water
systems, are increasingly replicating regulatory environments desirable for the profit of
transnational corporations; decisions associated with these processes are also largely a matter of
remote control from the global North through international and transnational institutions. In that
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process, the voices and roles of people in southern Iraq are excluded unless aligned with the
dominant knowledge production and project implementation narratives.
The dominance of the North was clear throughout fieldwork in southern Iraq. An illustrative
example of this is the four-day Ramsar Talks in Iraq, where government officials, civil society
institutions and UN agencies were present, the role of Nature Iraq— the organization that was at
the forefront of the marsh restoration—was wholly dismissed during the discussions of the
history of the restoration of the Iraqi marshes post-2003.341 The credit was given to the Ministry
of Water Resources, UN Assistant Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and UNDP; these entities were
applauded as key players behind the formulation, financing, and implementation of the marsh
restorations. While the UNDP and the MoWR did play a critical role in financing and
implementing the restoration projects, the idea of diverting the Euphrates water to the marshes
was spearheaded by Jassim Al-Assadi and Azzam Alwash, marsh residents and employees of
Nature Iraq.342
International, regional, and transnational factors greatly impact the options and decisions that are
made about water in the national and local contexts. As a result of top-down knowledge
production on water, responses to water crisis function in accordance with programs, plans and
technologies that emanate from another place and another entirely different set of hydro-social
relations.343 In the process, displaced communities in southern Iraq become the least likely to
have a say in the water system on which their livelihoods depend.344 The process of top-down
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policy making isolates communities from their environment and renders peoples’ experiences,
voices and perceptions trivial. In excluding people from knowledge production about water and
its management means further abstracting water from its socio-environmental context. And as
Linton argues, abstracting water from its socio-environmental context by only viewing it in a
western scientific way allows the state and transnational companies to manipulate water
resources, and further displacement.

Conclusion
This Chapter presents data on water scarcity in Iraq and, in light of this data, analyzes the
perceptions of affected communities and policy makers, considering the reasons for differences
between data and perceptions as well as between different stakeholder perceptions. The Chapter
complicates assumptions about primitive culture, progress, and efficiency, and outlines the
implications of understanding water in southern Iraq through such discourses. The purpose of
this analysis is not to undercut the water governance shortcomings of the Iraqi government on
national and sub-national levels. Rather I seek to convey the complex nature and the production
of these narratives by adding to local factors the international and transnational factors with a
view to enabling more data driven and effective policy-making.
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Conclusion
Environmentally-induced displacement is a complex phenomenon. International, national and
transnational factors interplay and interact with each other and cannot be analyzed in isolation.
One of the drivers of displacement in Iraq has been a result of severe reduction in water levels.
This thesis argues that while various factors have always impacted water levels in Iraq, today
water is impacted more frequently, unpredictably, and severely than in the past. The issue of
water scarcity is due to privatization and commodification of water, climate change, years of
wars and destruction, regional development projects, and poor water governance, among other
factors; and the biggest impact has been on the most marginalized communities in southern Iraq the rural communities and the marsh inhabitants.

Policymakers cannot formulate effective policy about water issues and displacement without
examining the intersections of the multiple factors that are involved. All the factors, internal,
international and transnational, have to be considered in the process of policy making at all
levels. Iraqi policymakers, national and international organizations and local communities all
focus on different factors when addressing water issues; local communities emphasize
international and transnational factors, while policymakers’ perception highlights internal and
bilateral factors, thus underestimating the importance of other factors and how they impact and
interact with each other. Data and evidence shows that water scarcity is likely to increase and
contribute to greater numbers of displaced Iraqis. Iraqi policymakers need to formulate policy
which acknowledges that, in addition to internal factors, climate change is threatening Iraq in a
treacherous way. A global development model that privatizes and commodifies water benefits
corporations at the expense of poor Iraqis, in effect accentuating existing inequalities created by
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globalization, neoliberalism and capitalism. In addition, Iraq’s water crisis must be understood
in the context of climate change due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions coming from
outside Iraq, particularly from rich countries. Therefore, the range of possible actions that Iraq
can take to address its water problems are limited by and connected to environmental policy on
an international level. Policymakers need to take into account is how the western model of
development treats water as a commodifiable entity separated from its environmental and social
context. The problems of water, thus, demands a reconceptualization of economic models that
separate natural resources from their environmental and social context. Ultimately, to address
water scarcity, all of these factors need to be considered in an interrelated way.
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ANNEX
A. Breakdown and Results of Fieldwork Interviews
All fieldwork interviews were conducted from November 28, 2017 to January 6, 2018.
Interviews with policymakers and civil society groups took an average of an hour each while
interviews with farmers and buffalo herders took an average of 20-25 minutes each. Translation
of all interviews and materials in Arabic was undertaken by the author of this thesis. Below is a
breakdown of the interviews:
Breakdown of Fieldwork Interviews
Stakeholder
Group

Number and Gender of Interviewees

Displaced
Populations

13 (7 M/5 F)
Missan
30 (28 M/3
F) Dhi Qar
15 (M) Al
Qadyysiah

20 Farmers
30 buffalo herders
8 farmers and buffalo herders

Total: 58 (50 M/8 F)
Local
Policymakers

Civil Society
Groups

3 (M) Directorate of Water Resources in Dhi Qar, Al Qadyysiah and Missan
3 (M) Directorate of Agriculture in Dhi Qar, Al Qadyysiah and Missan
3 (2 M/1 F) Directorate of Environment Dhi Qar, Al Qadyysiah and Missan
1 (M) Deputy Director of the Ministry of Water Resources
Total: 10 (8 M, 1 F)
3 (M), 1 in each governorate (Dhi Qarriya, Missan, Al Qadyysiah )
Total: 71 (62 M/9 F) interviews

Fieldwork Results
Stakeholder
Group
58 displaced
communities

Responses
Local factors:
- 55 people indicated that impingement is an issue but that climate change and
water scarcity is the reason why people impinge on their water shares.
- 4 people indicated that impingement is the reason for water scarcity issues
without mentioning climate change.
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-

54 perceived issues of patronage networks as another reason for water
depletion
International factors:
- 58 indicated that climate change is the main contributing factor to water
scarcity

10 local
Policymakers

Transnational factors:
- 58 indicated that water has been commodified and that they had to pay for
water which made it difficult for them to have drinking water and that
Local factors:
- 10 indicated that inefficient farming and irrigation practices, and the
cultivation of crops such as barley and wheat are contributing to scarcity of
water
- 5 mentioned that decentralization and miscommunication and
mismanagement within governorate offices.
International factors:
- 10 indicated that dam building in neighboring countries is a contributing
factor to water scarcity
- 2 indicated that climate change is a contributing factor to water scarcity

3 civil society
members

Local factors:
- 3 mentioned the mismanagement of water resources but that it was related to
issues of climate change
International factors:
- 3 indicated that climate change is the main contributing factor to water
scarcity
Transnational factors:
- 3 spoke about the issues of commodification of water resources but did not
mentioned privatization

B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
I. RESEARCH QUESTIONS FOR DISPLACED POPULATIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

How big is your family?
Who is the head of the households/breadwinner?
When did you arrive to this town/village?
How long have you been here
What is your current source of livelihood?
Migration:
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6.
7.
8.
9.

Where did you migrate from?
What was the source of your livelihood in your native village?
Where else have you stayed since you migrated from your native village?
Why did you choose to migrate?

Water:
10. What kind of usage was the water for?
11. How have water resources changed in your native village throughout the last decade?
a. Has this change impacted your decision to move?
b. How has this change impacted your livelihood? **elaborate on this
c. Could you do the same work if you would like to in your current location that you
did in your villages?
d. When did water resources start to change/diminish?
e. How has water scarcity impacted agriculture/herding?
12. What do you think caused the changes in the availability of water?
Implications:
13. How has the move to this new place impacted your livelihood?
14. Were there people who stayed in the village from which you migrated?
a. Why did they stay?
15. Do you have plans of returning or moving somewhere else?
a. If not, why?
16. How do you view the link between your movement and water issues that your villages
might have had?
17. How should policy makers on a local and international level address issues related to
water scarcity?
II.

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR CIVIL
SOCIETY/ADVOCATES/RESEARCHERS

1. How is the environment relevant to your research/work?
2. What factors have contributed to the water issues Iraq is facing?
- National
- International
- Transnational
3. What do you think about Iraq’s policy approach on the environment, especially water
management?
4. What is the relationship between movement and water scarcity?
5. What is the role of international actors in addressing water issues in Iraq?
6. How can Iraq’s policy approach be improved?
7. How have water issues affected you?
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III.

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS WITH POLICY MAKERS

Introduction
1. How long have you worked in your current position?
2. What prompted you to get involved in environmental-related policy work?
3. What are some of the overarching environmental issues in Iraq?
Water-related Questions
4. How have the quality and levels of water changed within the last few decades? Or in more
recent years?
7. What are the factors that have impacted these water issues?
- International:
- Internal:
- Transnational
On Water and Movement
5. How are these water issues impacting people’s livelihoods?
6. How do you understand the link between movement and water scarcity?
Environmental Policies to Water Issues
8. What are you policy approaches to address these issues?
9. In what areas can Iraq’s policy approach to water issues be improved?
10. What do you think the role of international actors is?
Environmental law/water management
11. What is the role of the office in implementing environmental law 17 of 1997
12. What factors implicate water resource management between Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria?
13. How do you foresee the issue of water sharing with Turkey unfold?
C. CONSENT FORM (English and Arabic)

Documentation of Informed Consent for Participation in Research Study
Project Title: Environmentally-Induced Displacement in Southern Iraq
Principal Investigator: Tiba Fatli/ tfatli@aucegypt.edu/0101-222-7629
*You are being asked to participate in a research study. The purpose of the research is to
investigate the factors of water scarcity in Southern Iraq and its implications on displacement.
The findings may be published and/or presented. The expected duration of your participation is
half an hour.
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The procedures of the research will be as follows: I will ask a question and you can take as much
as much as you need to answer it. If the question is irrelevant to you, please feel free to indicate
so and we can move on to the next one. If, at any point, you would like to stop for any reason
please let me know and we will stop the interview. You do not have to provide any reasoning
and are free to withdrawal from the research at any point. Throughout the interview, I will be
writing notes, which I will type up in my computer that is protected by a password. The written
notes will be destroyed as soon as they are stored in the computer. Once I submit my research to
my department where I am studying which is AUC, I will destroy all the records I have on the
computer.
*There may be certain risks or discomforts associated with this research, including retaining
information and stories of migration. Please, remember that you are free to withdrawal if the
questions or the conversation causes any discomfort at any point.
*There will be benefits to you from this research in that it will draw attention to the issue of
water scarcity in South Iraq and displacement. I will, to my best ability, incorporate your voices
in writing this thesis and presenting it.
*The information you provide for purposes of this research is confidential. There will be no
name, pictures or recording associated with any of the interviews.
Questions about the research, my rights, or research-related injuries should be directed to Tiba
Fatli at +20 0101 222 7629
*Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any time
without penalty or the loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Signature

________________________________________

Printed Name

________________________________________

Date

________________________________________

D. DATA RECORDED BY THE METEOROLOGY AND SEISMIC
MONITORING CENTER, IRAQ’S MINISTRY OF
TRANSPORTATION
STATION: DHI QARRIYA
YEA
MAR
R
JAN. FEB.
.

ELEMENT: MONTHLY RAINFALL TOTALS (mm)
MAY
JUL AUG
OCT NOV
APR.
.
JUN.
.
.
SEP.
.
.

DEC
.

2005

45.2

0.9

33.7

3.9

TR.

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.2

21.8

2006

27.5

59.5

6.1

25.2

1.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

26.9

17.7

81.0

2007

9.2

0.1

75.8

5.5

TR.

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0

TR.

21.9

2008

19.4

10.8

0.4

1.4

0.2

0.2

TR.

0.0

0.2

32.2

0.7

0.0

2009

0.3

7.1

18.6

4.6

2.7

0.5

29.2

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

0.2
0.1

22.3

2.6

0.6
0.0

1.7

2010

1.5
14.8

0.4

7.3

2011

7.5

19.9

13.8

21.2

9.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

TR.

13.0

0.0

2012

6.2

21.6

1.3

6.7

TR.

0.0

TR.

0.0

0.0

2.6

58.5

19.3
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2013
2014
2015
2016

8.8
78.3
0.9
0.4

0.2
0.5
14.4
12.9

STATION:KUT
YEA
R
JAN. FEB.

36.0
TR.
0.9
0.1

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1.8
24.6
24.4
0.0

126.
4
13.3
8.3
24.5

0.3
83.0
7.2
10.0

TR.
16.1
1.0
7.6

MAR
.

ELEMENT: MONTHLY RAINFALL TOTALS (mm)
MAY
JUL AUG
OCT NOV
APR.
.
JUN.
.
.
SEP.
.
.

1.7
3.9
36.1
2.8

DEC
.

2005

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

2006

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

2007

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

2008

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

2009

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

2010

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

2011

51.3

18.5

2.1

30.6

2.1

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.1

0.3

1.3

2012

1.1

4.7

5.1

1.0

0.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.4

48.9

50.3

2013

28.3

7.3

TR.

TR.

87.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.5

53.8

7.1

2014

54.2
8.9
21.3

30.7
5.2
7.2

38.0
28.2
34.1

16.9
6.0
38.3

1.0
6.5
0.1

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

12.6
6.4
0.0

35.9
61.0

TR.
44.3

TR.

20.7

2015
2016

STATION:AL QADYYSIAH
YEA
MAR
R
JAN. FEB.
.

ELEMENT: MONTHLY RAINFALL TOTALS (mm)
MAY
JUL AUG
OCT NOV
APR.
.
JUN.
.
.
SEP.
.
.

DEC
.

2005

37.9

11.2

12.1

6.6

TR.

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

32.8

TR.

2006

29.9

27.4

8.1

8.9

4.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.3

17.0

8.4

2007

12.4

9.2

0.6

4.5

1.9

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

TR.

TR.

15.0

2008

22.9

0.9

0.3

3.1

TR.

TR.

0.0

0.0

0.0

7.8

8.5

0.7

2009

TR.

2.7

7.8

9.9

TR.

TR.

0.0

0.0

0.0

5.5

2.8

17.5

2010

3.3

4.8

5.1

18.4

8.2

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

TR.

TR.

9.3

2011

27.1

17.6

1.8

26.0

2.0

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.4

TR.

5.1

2012

4.8

5.6

0.6

TR.

0.8

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

4.0

57.0

26.0

2013

25.6

4.3

TR.

0.1

31.6

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

TR.

61.1

1.3

2014

46.1

1.5

19.3

12.6

1.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

2.2

20.7

1.5

2015

2.2

8.5

10.8

5.5

1.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.4

69.5

38.3

2016

11.6

16.4

23.7

6.8

TR.

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

TR.

9.8

STATION:MISSAN

ELEMENT: MONTHLY RAINFALL TOTALS (mm)
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YEA
R

JAN.

FEB.

MAR
.

APR.

MAY
.

JUN.

JUL
.

AUG
.

SEP.

OCT
.

NOV
.

DEC
.

2005

79.3

1.8

37.9

6.7

0.4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.1

29.0

2006

37.1

71.9

6.3

11.8

0.5

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

25.6

33.0

65.2

2007

14.2

1.2

64.2

9.1

1.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

1.5

33.2

2008

2011

34.9
TR.
6.6
55.4

3.6
4.0
17.6
15.0

0.3
7.4
0.1
11.2

2.4
10.5
69.9
17.4

TR.
8.7
25.9
2.6

0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.3
0.0

0.0
TR.
0.1
0.0

0.4
0.4
0.0
0.0

25.4
45.8
0.0
TR.

TR.
94.7
7.7
TR.

2012

5.6

18.8

0.3

3.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

3.2

2013

26.0
66.7
8.1
1.6

4.3
2.6
20.5
24.6

0.2
63.5
9.5
18.0

TR.
26.5
3.8
10.7

0.1
138.
4
2.7
2.6
7.2

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.9
20.0
29.5
0.0

23.6
4.4
TR.
9.1
131.
1
147.
0
12.5
19.5
6.2

2009
2010

2014
2015

50.0

7.8
12.5

35.0
13.3

2016
STAT
ION:
DHI
QAR
RIYA
YEA
R

JAN.

FEB.

MAR
.

APR.

MAY

JUN.

JUL.

AUG.

SEP.

OCT.

NOV.

DEC.

2005

18.0

19.9

26.3

33.9

39.8

43.7

46.6

46.0

42.0

36.2

24.9

22.7

2006

18.2

20.4

28.0

33.6

40.1

46.0

45.3

48.3

42.4

36.8

24.1

15.0

2007

15.7

21.8

25.7

31.6

41.1

44.4

45.7

46.2

43.2

38.0

27.9

19.5

2008

14.2

20.7

31.2

36.0

40.0

43.8

46.5

47.1

43.1

34.9

25.3

20.2

2009

18.2

23.0

26.9

31.5

40.0

43.2

44.7

45.9

41.4

36.9

25.9

21.9

2010

22.4

24.1

30.9

34.5

40.3

45.9

47.2

48.8

44.7

38.9

29.2

23.3

2011

22.3

21.2

26.6

32.5

40.2

45.8

47.3

48.7

44.6

38.6

28.8

21.0

2012

18.4

20.1

25.1

31.4

40.1

44.7

47

.46.3

42.7.

36.7

26.1

21.1

2013

18.7

23.7

29.1

33.6

36.5

42.8

45.6

45.5

42.2

33.8

24.3

17.9

2014

16.8

20.8

26.9

33.6

39.9

43.8

45.6

46.6

42.7

34.4

25.1

22.2

2015

20.1

22.4

27.5

33.4

41.7

44.5

47.3

47.9

44.3

37.5

25.9

18.3

2016

18.7

23.6

27.8

34.7

40.2

45.0

47.3

48.6

42.7

37.6

26.6

18.7

ELEMMENT: MEAN MAX.
ْ
TEMP.(C◌)
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